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A CONTRACTARIAN CRITIQUE OF CITIZENS UNITED 
Joseph F. Morrissey! 
“[P]olitical speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply 
because its source is a corporation.’” 
- Justice Kennedy, for the 5-4 majority in Citizens United1 
“[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, 
no desires. . . . [T]hey are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by 
whom and for whom our Constitution was established.” 
- Justice Stevens, dissenting in Citizens United2 
ABSTRACT  
This Article advances a new framework for analyzing whether and when regulation of 
corporations is warranted.  This new framework springs from a contractarian perspective.  Using 
that perspective, ordinarily the constituents of a corporation should be allowed the autonomy to 
structure their bargains involving the corporation in whatever way they see fit, absent government 
regulation.  However, where the resulting bargains involved are plagued by some defects, either 
procedural or substantive, then ex ante regulation is not only constitutional but is also prudent.  
This Article uses a critique of the now famous Citizens United case to illustrate and develop this 
framework.  The justification for regulation is even more compelling where the absence of 
regulation creates some systemic risk to our economy or democracy that would not easily be cured by 
ex post judicial involvement. 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 5-4 majority overturned a 
congressional enactment limiting corporate electioneering.  Decided in 2010, the Citizens United 
opinion has been harshly criticized by a broad spectrum of people, ranging from President Obama 
to Ben & Jerry.  A group of senators has even called for a constitutional amendment to undo the 
results of that decision.  In this Article, I criticize the majority opinion in Citizens United for 
ignoring the prevailing contractarian view of a corporation.  In so doing, the majority arrived at 
the false conclusion that corporations should be entitled to the constitutional protections of 
 
 ! Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law.  B.A., Princeton University, 1989; 
J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1993.  Many friends and colleagues helped in 
developing the ideas contained in this Article, including my friend and colleague Dean 
Jamie Fox, and, arguably, one of the leading authorities in the country on Citizens United, 
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy.  Further, the organizers and participants in the 7th Annual 
International Contracts Conference deserve my gratitude for allowing me to present this 
idea and for diligently critiquing my critique.  Of course, my tireless research assistants, 
Ross Mabery and Alexander Zesch, were a terrific source of support, as was my 
administrative team of Diane Oeste and Janice Strawn. 
 1 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l 
Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)). 
 2 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
766 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
individual citizens.   
Under the contractarian paradigm, corporations are understood as a nexus of contracts among the 
corporation’s constituents.  Contractarians typically draw the normative conclusion that since 
parties freely enter into those contracts, parties should be at liberty to set whatever terms they like, 
without government regulation.  
My Article argues for the opposite normative conclusion, that because the contracts at stake in fact 
are often not bargained for freely or fairly, as the theoreticians argue, there is need for government 
regulation to ensure the contracting process and the resulting bargains are fair.  This need for 
regulation is all the more compelling in a case like Citizens United where the very nature of our 
democratic process is at stake. 
This reconceived contractarian paradigm should empower both judicial and legislative bodies to 
appropriately regulate and even limit the activities of corporations.  It is my hope that this Article 
might encourage jurists and legislators to do just that. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the quotes above illustrate, a battle is raging in the Supreme Court.  
At its core, this battle is about the proper role of corporations in our 
economy and in our democracy.3  This Article will present a new analytical 
framework that suggests that, where the bargains involving the constituents 
of a corporation are not fairly or freely entered into, ex ante regulation is 
not only constitutional, it is also prudent. 
The most recent catalyst that renewed this battle over whether and when 
to regulate corporations was Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
decided in January 2010.4  That case has quickly become a landmark case on 
an issue that is at the crossroads of three distinct doctrinal areas of law:  
contract, corporate, and constitutional law. 
In Citizens United, a 5-4 majority overturned a congressional enactment 
that placed specific limits on a corporation’s ability to use corporate money 
to advocate for or against politicians during election seasons.5  According to 
the Citizens United majority, the political campaign context is an area where 
corporations are entitled to the same First Amendment protection as natural 
persons.6  Thus, the majority struck down what it deemed an 
unconstitutional restraint on corporate First Amendment free speech 
rights.7 
In this Article, I criticize the majority opinion in Citizens United for 
ignoring the prevailing contractarian view of a corporation.8  As a result of 
 
 3 In his dissent, Justice Stevens described the majority opinion as threatening “to 
undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”  Id. at 931. 
 4 Id. at 876 (majority opinion). 
 5 Id. at 917. 
 6 Id. at 904–08 (proclaiming that a corporation’s and an individual’s political speech are 
equally “indispensable” to democratic principles). 
 7 Id. at 903, 907. 
 8 Professor Stefan Padfield disagrees with the view that the Justices ignored the 
contractarian paradigm.  Instead, he has reasoned that even though the Citizens United 
majority did not acknowledge corporate law scholarship in its opinion, it seemed to have 
impliedly adopted a view of the corporation as an aggregate of its constituent citizens.  
Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation:  More Than a Nexus-of-Contracts, 114 W. VA. L. 
REV. 209, 224 (2011) [hereinafter Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation] (“The [Citizens 
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the Court’s approach, the majority arrived at the false conclusion that 
corporations should be entitled to the constitutional protections of 
individual citizens.  This Article presents a new way of using the 
contractarian paradigm as a defense of corporation regulation. 
Under the contractarian paradigm, corporations are understood as a 
nexus of contracts among the corporation’s constituents.  Contractarians 
typically draw the normative conclusion that since parties freely enter into 
those contracts, parties should be at liberty to set whatever terms they like, 
without government regulation. 
My Article argues the opposite normative conclusion:  that where the 
resulting bargains involved are plagued by some defects, either procedural 
or substantive, then ex ante regulation is not only constitutional, but is also 
prudent.  The justification for regulation is even more compelling in cases 
like Citizens United where the absence of regulation creates some systemic 
risk to our economy or democracy that would not easily be cured by ex post 
judicial involvement. 
As a nexus of contracts, corporations are entirely distinct from 
individuals.  Thus, granting them the protections an individual receives 
under the Constitution is mistaken.   
Part One of this Article will discuss the Citizens United decision itself.  
This Part will highlight the majority’s defense of raising a corporation up as 
an equal to an individual for free speech purposes (at least in the election 
law context).  It will also outline the dissent’s arguments that the majority 
has turned the Constitution on its head by taking on a constitutional issue 
not presented by the parties and establishing new precedent that further 
frees corporations from government regulation. 
Part Two of this Article will discuss two of the dominant paradigms for 
understanding a corporation discussed in corporate law scholarship.  
However, this Part will focus on the prevailing economic perspective to 
 
United] majority viewed the corporation as fundamentally little more than an association 
of citizens.”).  Professor Padfield equates this “association of citizens” view of a 
corporation with the contractarian nexus of contracts paradigm, and he explains that an 
explicit adoption of the nexus of contracts paradigm would have allowed the majority to 
“conclude that there was nothing about the corporation qua corporation that justified 
restricting corporate political speech solely on the basis of corporate identity.”  Stefan J. 
Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 25, 26 (2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/
Padfield_Online_Article.pdf [hereinafter Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-of-
Contracts Presumption]; see also Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” 
Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 222 & n.7, 265 (concluding that the 
Citizens United majority’s treatment of corporations is an implicit adoption of “real entity” 
theory, which “posits that the corporation, as an entity, is entitled to constitutional 
protection independent of its shareholders,” and arguing that such a theory does not 
accord with the original intentions of the drafters of the Constitution). 
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further develop my contractarian’s defense of corporation regulation.  In 
this Part, I will explain why the contractarian paradigm of the corporation as 
a nexus of contracts is the most helpful paradigm available and why, in 
accord with that theory, corporations should still be subject to regulation.  
This theoretical discussion will develop this contractarian paradigm as an 
analytical tool for assessing whether and when regulation of corporations is 
both constitutional and prudential.  It will also apply that analytical 
framework to the Citizens United case itself. 
Part Three will discuss some of the responses that have been proposed to 
remediate the Citizens United decision.  It will assess those responses using 
the contractarian framework developed in Part Two.  It will ultimately 
recommend further advocacy of a corporation’s appropriately regulated 
place in both our economy and our democracy. 
I. PART ONE:  THE CITIZENS UNITED DECISION 
The catalyst for the battle over a corporation’s appropriate role in our 
nation’s political system was the Citizens United decision.  Much has been 
written about Citizens United,9 and the opinion itself spans more than one 
hundred pages, including the concurrences and dissents.10  This Article will 
present a thorough analysis of this case from the perspective of how the 
Supreme Court views a corporation, with a specific focus on whether and 
when a corporation should be subject to regulation. 
This Part will (A) put that decision into its political context, before (B) 
briefly presenting an overview of the facts of the case.  This Part will then 
examine (C) why the Court insisted on deciding whether the statute in 
question was constitutional even though the litigants did not ask the Court 
to do so; and (D) the central substantive issue of whether the fiction of 
corporate personhood should have been extended to empower corporations 
with the same free speech rights as individual persons. 
A.  The Political Context 
The venue for the battle over a corporation’s appropriate role in our 
nation’s political system is not limited to the Supreme Court.  Indeed, each 
of our three branches of government has spoken on the issue of what role 
 
 9 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999 
(2010); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity:  Changing Views of 
Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2010); 
Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 161 (2010). 
 10 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876. 
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corporations should play in politics and, at least at the moment, the Court is 
at odds both with the other two branches, and with itself. 
Congress, our legislative branch, was the first to speak on the issue.11  
Relying on decades of similar legislation and precedent that reacted to that 
legislation, Congress carefully crafted and enacted the restricting regulation:  
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).12  The impetus for 
the enactment was Congress’s finding that corporations can create a 
distorting effect in the political process due to their ability to accumulate 
massive amounts of wealth and their duty to zealously advocate single-
mindedly for the wealth maximization of their shareholders.13 
And Congress has been no stranger to corporate regulation action over 
the years.  Historically, the most massive corporate regulatory effort was the 
overarching statutory framework established by the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 193314 and the Exchange Act of 1934.15  Both of those acts implicate 
the First Amendment because they involve forced speech in the form of 
disclosure requirements for corporations.16  The most recent congressional 
 
 11 Congress has wrestled for centuries with the question of how to eliminate corruption, 
including the appearance of corruption, in elections.  The fear is that supporters of 
candidates are later rewarded with special access to the politician, jobs, contracts, or 
other favors.  See, e.g., Louis Lawrence Boyle, Reforming Civil Service Reform:  Should the 
Federal Government Continue to Regulate State and Local Government Employees?, 7 J.L. & POL. 
243, 246–54 (1991) (summarizing congressional efforts beginning in 1791 to reform 
participation by civil servants in electoral politics, as a result of concern about perceived 
corruption in the political system).  Congress has regularly spoken on these matters.  See, 
e.g., infra notes 145–49. 
 12 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006). 
 13 There was some debate over whether the law would effectively eliminate all corporate 
“soft money” influence on elections, but generally corporate campaign finance was 
understood to be a problem.  Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 107-131, pt. 1, at 48 (2001) (“There 
simply is too much special-interest money from too few sources flowing into party 
committees in the form of soft money, and onto the airwaves in the form of thinly 
disguised political advertisements paid for with unrestricted dollars from entities that are 
permitted, under today’s broken campaign finance regime, to disclose as much or as little 
about their operations as they choose.  Many of these entities are barred by the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) from raising and spending any money to influence 
federal campaigns.  Increased reliance on soft money shows no signs of abating, and is of 
particular concern.”); see also Trevor Potter, McConnell v. FEC Jurisprudence and Its Future 
Impact on Campaign Finance, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 185, 185–86 (2006) (explaining that the 
BCRA was intended primarily to both eliminate soft money donations, “i.e. donations not 
in compliance with amount limits, source prohibitions, and reporting requirements,” and 
also to prohibit corporations from financing electioneering communications from 
corporate treasury funds). 
 14 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006). 
 15 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006). 
 16 See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach 
to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 641–45 (2006) (observing that “[t]he 
securities regulation regime currently inhabits an island of immunity from the First 
Amendment”). 
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attempts to regulate modern abuses of the corporate form are the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002,17 and the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.18 
The Supreme Court responded to Congress in its majority opinion in the 
Citizens United case.19  The majority struck down the campaign finance 
regulation on the basis that corporations are people and should receive the 
same First Amendment protections on their freedom of speech as natural 
people.20  The Court spoke aggressively about speech being an “essential 
 
 17 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
and 18 U.S.C.).  For a comprehensive early analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
opportunities missed by that legislation, see Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the Culprits:  Is 
Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801 (2003) (assessing the likely impact 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the anti-fraud rules of the U.S. securities market shortly 
after it was signed into law and proposing ways the judiciary and legislature could 
improve and/or correct the Act’s deficiencies); see also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) 
(examining the corporate governance mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
concluding the Act was “seriously misconceived”); Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta 
Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 
1862 (2008) (analyzing corporate governance indices and finding that a flexible 
regulatory regime is more desirable than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s “one-size-fits-all” 
approach). 
 18 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. 2012).  For an assessment of proposed regulatory solutions to 
recent corporate misconduct, see Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Meltdown, 45 TULSA L. REV. 
393 (2010) (discussing the insufficiencies of the regulatory reforms proposed in the wake 
of the recent financial crisis, and offering suggestions for how they may be strengthened); 
Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1866 (2011) (“Regulatory responses to the bailout have fallen back 
on familiar tools like shareholder empowerment, disclosure, and independence, with no 
acknowledgement that the investing landscape has changed in ways that make traditional 
regulatory approaches unlikely to advance underlying regulatory aims.”); Nicola Faith 
Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435 (2011) 
(arguing that the regulatory reforms aimed at improving the monitoring of corporate 
boards amount to nothing more than “cosmetic independence”); see also Padfield, The 
Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 8 (arguing that Dodd-Frank creates problems for 
adherents of contractarianism both from a positive perspective, because it is a reminder 
that the state retains the power to dictate terms vis-à-vis the corporation regardless of how 
much the state may have chosen to advance freedom of contract previously, and from a 
normative perspective, because it officially announces the arrival of the too-big-to-fail 
corporation, which at least some contractarians would previously have argued should not 
arise in de-regulated competitive markets). 
 19 Interestingly, some state regulatory initiatives have been upheld by federal courts after 
Citizens United.  See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure?  
Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1057, 1084–89 (2011) (describing state campaign disclosure laws that have been upheld 
by courts in the wake of Citizens United). 
 20 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904–08 (2010) (rejecting the 
antidistortion rationale that was developed by the Court in Austin, and holding instead 
that Congress is prohibited by the First Amendment from limiting the political speech of 
associations of people that happen to “ha[ve] taken on the corporate form” (citing 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 913)). 
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mechanism of democracy.”21  It facilitates citizens’ paramount right “to 
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information.”22  The Court was clear 
that those rights extend not only to natural citizens, but also to corporations, 
entities whose speech is “a precondition to enlightened self-government.”23  
But even the Citizens United Court was split, with five Justices in the majority 
and four Justices proffering a scathing dissent.24 
After Congress and the Supreme Court spoke to the issue, the President 
of the United States added his voice.  In a press release issued by the White 
House on the day the decision was released, the President stated,  
With its ruling today, the Supreme Court has given a green light to a new 
stampede of special interest money in our politics.  It is a major victory 
for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other 
powerful interests that . . . drown out the voices of everyday Americans.25   
Perhaps speaking from his background as a constitutional law professor 
at the University of Chicago, President Obama went on in his State of the 
Union address that followed the release of that opinion to criticize the 
Court’s decision as unjustifiably reversing one hundred years of established 
 
 21 Id. at 898 (“Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold 
officials accountable to the people.”). 
 22 Id. (“The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach 
consensus is a precondition of enlightened self-government and a necessary means to 
protect it.”). 
 23 Id. (“[The BCRA’s] prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on 
speech. . . . [This] is a precondition to enlightened self-government, and a necessary 
means to protect it.”). 
 24 As has all too often been the case in recent years, the First Amendment aspects of the 
Court’s opinion were split along partisan lines:  conservative Justices were in the majority 
(Justices Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas) leaving the liberal Justices 
outnumbered (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Stevens).  Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky has recently written an article discussing this troubling trend of partisan 
Supreme Court decisions.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, 
63 FED. COMM. L.J. 579, 581–82 (2011) (“[Y]ou can understand the Roberts Court better 
by reading the 2008 Republican platform than by reading the Federalist Papers, 
and . . . that is certainly true with regard to freedom of speech.”); see also Gene Nichol, 
Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on Democracy, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 
(2011) (criticizing the Roberts Court’s judicial activism—including its practices of 
bringing up matters or scheduling re-argument on its own, as well as overruling 
significant precedents—with a particular aim at Chief Justice Roberts because of the 
“grotesque hypocrisy” of the promise he made during his confirmation hearing to “just 
call balls and strikes” (quoting Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. 
to be Chief Justice of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
56 (2005) (statement of John Roberts, nominee, C.J. of the U.S. Supreme Court))). 
 25 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement from the President on 
Today’s Supreme Court Decision (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-todays-supreme-court-
decision-0. 
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precedent regulating corporate involvement in campaign finance and 
“open[ing] the floodgates for special interests.”26 
And the Supreme Court—at least one member—seemed to speak out 
again.  As one of six Supreme Court Justices sitting in the House of 
Representatives listening to President Obama’s State of the Union 
chastisement, Justice Alito was visibly shaking his head in disagreement with 
the President’s Citizens United assessment.27  Justice Alito went so far as to 
mouth the words, “not true.”28  Justice Alito was, of course, part of the 
majority. 
But perhaps more important than what any particular branch of the 
government says, the people who are responsible for electing our 
government representatives have spoken on the issue.  First, as seen with the 
Tea Party’s unexpected rise during the 2010 midterm elections,29 the people 
began demanding more accountability and transparency; not just from 
government, but also from the corporations and banks bailed out by the 
government.30  The Occupy Wall Street movement stands apart from the Tea 
Party Movement, and it has swept through cities around the country.31  
 
 26 Barack H. Obama, President of the United States, Address Before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 27, 2010), at 8 (“With all due deference to 
separation of powers, last week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I 
believe will open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations, to 
spend without limit in our elections.”). 
 27 See Alito Reacts to Obama Remarks, ABC NEWS VIDEO (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerIndex?id=9682842 (“Justice Alito shakes his head 
when Obama hits campaign finance decision.”). 
 28 Id. 
 29 There is some debate over the significance of the Tea Party in the 2010 mid-term 
elections; it had more success in the House elections than the Senate elections.  See 
generally Tea Party Movement, Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/ top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/t/tea_party_movement/index.html?8qa (last updated Oct. 4, 2012) 
(“The Tea Party became a pivotal player in the Republicans’ successful bid to take control 
of the House of Representatives in the 2010 midterm elections. . . . [However,] the 
numbers of Tea Party-affiliated winners in the November 2010 elections was [sic] 
relatively small . . . .”). 
 30 See generally Credit Crisis—Bailout Plan (TARP), Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/bailout_
plan/index.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2010) (“The Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
known as TARP and more familiarly as ‘the bank bailout’ was hastily put in place in 
September 2008 as stock markets plunged, credit markets around the globe seized up 
and the world seemed on the verge of a cataclysmic financial meltdown.  Congress 
authorized the Treasury Department to use up to $700 billion to stabilize financial 
markets through the program—a step that inspired widespread public outrage, helping 
to fuel what became the Tea Party Movement, and, in the mind of most economists, one 
that played a crucial role in pulling the global economy back from the brink.”). 
 31 Many commentators question the ultimate message and motives of the Occupy Wall 
Street movement, pointing out its lack of demands and leaders.  These questions have not 
been completely settled.  See, e.g., Arthur S. Brisbane, Who Is Occupy Wall Street?, N.Y. 
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While there are no particular individuals leading the Occupy Wall Street 
movement,32 the movement’s central message is clear.  Among other issues, 
that message condemns corporate domination of elections and the 
manipulation of the political and economic system by the economic elite in 
the United States.33 
And Congress seems to be listening to the masses, as some members 
have responded directly to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United.  
On November 1, 2011, Senator Tom Udall, together with a group of seven 
United States Senators, introduced a proposed constitutional amendment to 
effectively reverse Citizens United.34  That proposed amendment would clarify 
that Congress and state legislatures are empowered to regulate campaign 
finance.  In Senator Udall’s words, “Citizens United has unleashed a flood of 
special interest money . . . . [T]he Courts have taken this [campaign finance 
area] over, we [in Congress] have to take it back.”35 
B.  The Factual Context 
The regulation at stake in Citizens United is the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).36  That Act amended previous election 
finance regulations to prohibit corporations from spending any of their 
 
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2011, at 12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/opinion/
sunday/who-is-occupy-wall-street.html (grappling with the difficulty of reporting on “a 
movement that pointedly eschews leadership and formal demands,” and hypothesizing 
that a “push to establish origins and leadership would help surface the demands, or at 
least the most important underlying issues” of the Occupy Wall Street movement). 
 32 Id. (“[S]ome members say the [Occupy Wall Street] groups are ‘leaderless.’” (quoting 
Jerry Ceppos, journalism dean at Louisiana State University)). 
 33 See Edith Honan & Edward McAllister, Thousands protest banks, corporate greed in U.S. 
marches, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2011, 7:51 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/10/15/us-usa-wallstreet-protests-idUSTRE79A41E20111015 (describing the 
protesters’ anger that U.S. banks are “enjoying booming profits after getting bailouts in 
2008, while many people are struggling in a difficult economy”); see also Occupy Movement 
(Occupy Wall Street), Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/organizations/o/occupy_wall_street/index.html (last updated Sept. 17, 
2012) (describing the original impetus for the Occupy Wall Street as making “a stand 
against corporate greed, social inequality and the corrosive power of major banks and 
multinational corporations over the democratic process”). 
 34 See The Dylan Ratigan Show (MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 3, 2011), available at 
http://video.msnbc.msn.com/dylan-ratigan-show/45155424#45155424 (interviewing 
Senator Udall, who asserted that “we need a constitutional amendment so that Congress 
can take back the authority to legislate on campaign finance reform” and need to 
recreate a “marketplace of ideas”). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Specifically, the section of the BCRA at issue in Citizens United was § 203, which amended 
§ 441b of Title 2 United States Code.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 
876, 913, 917 (2010). 
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treasury funds on electioneering communications, and also to impose 
certain disclosure and reporting requirements for permitted electioneering 
communications.37  The term “electioneering communications” is defined by 
federal statute and regulation as:  “any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
Office and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general 
election” and that is “publicly distributed.”38 
In December 2007, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, sought to 
distribute a documentary film entitled Hillary:  The Movie, assessing the 
candidacy of then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.39  The distribution 
would have occurred within thirty days of the 2008 primary elections for 
President and was thus arguably precluded by the BCRA.40  Citizens United 
brought suit against the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) in an attempt 
to get declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the BCRA’s application 
to Hillary:  The Movie was unconstitutional.41 
Citizens United claimed that the movie was just a documentary and 
therefore should not be deemed electioneering in any way.42  The courts 
disagreed and cited several passages from the movie:  the narrator begins 
the movie asking, “could [Hillary Clinton] become the first female president 
in the history of the United States?”;43 the movie goes on to describe her as 
“Machiavellian”;44 and it closes by warning the audience about what is at 
stake in the next election for President and that the decision should not be 
taken lightly.45 
The District Court ruled in favor of the FEC, finding that the statute 
clearly applied to the movie and thus precluded Citizens United from airing 
 
 37 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2), (c)(1)–(5) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913, 917 (2010). 
 38 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006); 11 C.F.R. 
§ 100.29(a)(2) (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 888. 
 42 Specifically, Citizens United had proffered the ironic argument that Hillary:  The Movie 
did not express advocacy for or against a specific candidate.  Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278–79 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 43 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 890. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. (“Finally, before America decides on our next president, voters should need no 
reminders of . . . what’s at stake . . . .” (alteration in original). 
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the movie within the prescribed period.46  The Supreme Court took the case 
on appeal.47 
The Supreme Court did not just rule that the statute was 
unconstitutional as applied to Hillary:  The Movie; it went further by also 
ruling that the statute was unconstitutional altogether.48  According to the 
majority opinion, the statute placed unique limits on a corporation’s ability 
to use corporate money to advocate for or against politicians during election 
seasons.49  Thus, the Court held, the enactment placed an unconstitutional 
restraint on the corporation’s First Amendment right to free speech.50  
Under this reasoning, corporations are entitled to the same First 
Amendment protection in this area as are natural persons. 
C.  The Need to Address Broad Constitutional Issues 
The first issue discussed by the majority was whether it even needed to 
evaluate a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute.51  In his 
dissent, Justice Stevens could not have exhibited more anger about the 
majority taking on that question.  Justice Stevens pointed out that Citizens 
United itself had dropped its facial challenge to the constitutionality of the 
statute and had pressed only an “as-applied” challenge.52  The litigating party 
sought only a limited ruling that the statute did not apply to it, so that it 
 
 46 See Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 281–82 (holding that plaintiff Citizens United had 
not established the required probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims in order 
to warrant injunctive or declaratory relief). 
 47 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 129 S. 
Ct. 594 (2008) (noting probable jurisdiction over the Citizens United appeal). 
 48 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (holding that the provisions of the BCRA barring 
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the 
First Amendment). 
 49 See id. at 898 (explaining that, by restricting the amount of money a corporation can 
spend on political communication during a campaign, the BCRA reduces the quantity 
and depth of corporate expression, as well as reducing the size of the audience reached). 
 50 See id. at 898–99 (holding that the BCRA’s “prohibition on corporate independent 
expenditures is thus a ban on speech,” and that that there is “no basis for the proposition 
that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on 
certain disfavored speakers,” i.e. corporations). 
 51 See id. at 892, 892–96 (determining that “the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower 
ground without chilling political speech” and defending this determination by explaining 
that “it is not judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the Court 
can avoid another argument with broader implications”). 
 52 Id. at 931–32 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the 
question of whether the BCRA was facially unconstitutional “was not properly brought 
before [the Court]” because the appellant Citizens United “never sought a declaration 
that [BCRA] § 203 was facially unconstitutional as to all corporations and unions”); see 
also id. at 892 (majority opinion) (“Citizens United stipulated to dismissing count 5 of its 
complaint, which raised a facial challenge to [2 U.S.C.] § 441b . . . .”). 
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could distribute its film.53  Justice Stevens emphasized that it was 
extraordinary for the Supreme Court to take on questions that are not 
brought by the litigants themselves.54 
Moreover, “facial challenges are disfavored”55 in order to preserve as 
much of the legislature’s work as possible.56  In Justice Stevens’s words, 
“[e]ssentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case 
before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to 
change the law.”57  This statement stands in stark contradistinction to the 
majority’s invocation of Chief Justice John Marshall’s instructions that it is 
the Court’s duty “to say what the law is,” but not to create it.58  In his dissent, 
Justice Stevens cited another cardinal principle of the judicial process:  “[i]f 
it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”59  In 
other words, the Supreme Court should not extend the reach of its opinions 
beyond what is absolutely necessary. 
Further, Justice Stevens argued that the majority’s approach flouted the 
maxim of judicial restraint, the notion that the judiciary should attempt to 
construe a statute as consonant with the Constitution to the extent possible 
and reach a facial constitutional challenge only when it absolutely must.60  
 
 53 Id. at 931–32 (characterizing appellant Citizens United’s claim as only that its film should 
not be subject to the BCRA “because [appellant’s speech] was ‘funded overwhelmingly by 
individuals’” (quoting Brief for Appellant at 29, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (Jan. 8, 
2008) (No. 08-205))). 
 54 Id. at 932 (“It is only in exceptional cases coming here from the federal courts that 
questions not pressed or passed upon below are reviewed.” (quoting Youakim v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 931 (“In 
declaring § 203 of BCRA facially unconstitutional . . . the majority decides this case on a 
basis relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, 
and argued here only in response to the Court’s invitation.  This procedure is unusual 
and inadvisable for a court.”). 
 55 Id. at 932 (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized in recent years that ‘[f]acial challenges 
are disfavored.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008))). 
 56 Id. at 932 (articulating the “normal rule” as favoring partial invalidation rather than facial 
invalidation, so that a statute is declared invalid only “to the extent that it reaches too far, 
but [is] otherwise left intact” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985))). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).  Oddly, the Citizens United majority cited this 
same passage from Marbury to justify departing from precedent.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
at 913 (2010) (majority opinion) (arguing that legislatures cannot prevent the Court 
from overruling its own precedents, because such an ability would allow Congress to 
interfere with the Court’s duty to “say what the law is”).  Justice Stevens described the 
majority’s Marbury citation as “perplexing.”  Id. at 934 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also infra notes 69 and 82. 
 59 Id. at 937 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing PDK Labs., Inc. v. 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
 60 See id. at 933 (“[C]ourts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in 
advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader 
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“The Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it 
strikes down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the role 
that corporations and unions play in electoral politics.”61 
The majority took Justice Stevens’s criticism to heart and addressed it 
directly.  After rejecting possible arguments that the BCRA would not apply 
to Citizens United’s film, the Court decided that it must reach the larger 
constitutional question.62  If the Court did not, the resulting prohibition of 
films such as Hillary:  The Movie would untenably chill political speech.  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated:  “It is not judicial restraint 
to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the Court can avoid another 
argument with broader implications.”63 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy explained that even though Citizens United 
had dropped its facial challenge to the constitutionality of the BCRA, the 
challenge had been raised—and rejected—at the federal district court level 
and therefore could be reconsidered on appeal.64  Additionally, the Court 
explained that since the appellant Citizens United was making a First 
Amendment argument, any theories to support that argument could be 
entertained.65  The Court emphasized that attempting to deal with only the 
as-applied question would require future courts to determine standards for 
the BCRA’s application that would be both difficult and uncertain.66  Finally, 
the Court stressed that the speech interest at stake was so crucial to the 
democratic process that a full review of the regulation was warranted and 
indeed necessary.67 
 
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450)). 
 61 Id.  
 62 See id. at 892 (majority opinion) (asserting that resolving the case on a “narrower ground” 
would chill political speech). 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id. at 892–93 (explaining that “even if a party could somehow waive a facial challenge 
while preserving an as-applied challenge, that would not prevent the Court 
from . . . addressing the facial validity [of the statute at issue],” as long as the issue was not 
presented below because the lower court passed on that issue, and concluding that the 
ruling by the District Court in Citizens United presented such a case). 
 65 Id. at 893 (noting that “throughout the litigation, Citizens United has asserted a claim 
that the FEC has violated its First Amendment right to free speech” and that “‘[o]nce a 
federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that 
claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995))). 
 66 Id. at 894–95 (describing the “uncertainty caused by the litigating position of the 
Government” and concluding that because “the Government holds out the possibility of 
ruling for Citizens United on a narrow ground yet refrains from adopting that position, 
the added uncertainty demonstrates the necessity to address the question of statutory 
validity”). 
 67 Id. at 895–96 (highlighting the “primary importance of speech itself to the integrity of the 
election process” as a reason that the “ongoing chill upon speech that is beyond all doubt 
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The majority of the Court went so far as to invoke Marbury v. Madison 
and echo the famous words penned there:  that it is the Court’s duty “to say 
what the law is.”68  Justice Stevens, in his dissent, retorted that the Court does 
not normally flout what its predecessors have said the law is, nor does it 
“typically say what the law is not as a hedge against future judicial error” 
(referring to the Court’s decision to rule the statute unconstitutional only in 
order to avoid the difficulty that future courts might have in applying the 
statute).69 
Thus, despite the strenuous objections of Justice Stevens on behalf of 
four of the Justices and the canons of constitutional interpretation 
mentioned above, including the maxim of judicial restraint, the majority 
went to great lengths to make sure it took on the larger facial question of the 
constitutionality of the statute.  The majority seems to have been intent on 
taking this opportunity to further empower corporations. 
D.  Whether Corporations Have the Free Speech Rights of Individuals 
In light of the facial challenge to the constitutionality of the BCRA, the 
core issue of the Citizens United opinion became whether corporations have 
the same free speech rights as individuals, specifically in the context of 
electioneering.70  If so, the BCRA could not withstand constitutional scrutiny 
under the First Amendment.71  The Justices on both sides of the answer to 
this question used a wide range of constitutional interpretive tools to justify 
their conclusions.  Embedded in their discussions were implicit notions 
about the very nature of a corporation.72  Chief among the interpretive tools 
employed in the debate between the majority and dissenting opinions are:  
(i) original intent; (ii) respect for the principle of stare decisis; and (iii) the 
balancing of interests. 
 
protected” in the case at hand requires a return “to the earlier precedents that a statute 
which chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been 
demonstrated”). 
 68 Id. at 913 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
 69 Id. at 934 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 895–96 
(majority opinion). 
 70 Id. (providing context by describing the strong protection of free speech in general, and 
then enumerating the variety and breadth of corporate speech prohibited by the BCRA 
in the electioneering context). 
 71 Id. at 898 (“If [2 U.S.C.] § 441b applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is 
merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech.  Its purpose and effect are to 
silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.”). 
 72 This is abundantly clear from some of the attacks on Justice Stevens’s dissent.  See, e.g., id. 
at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite the corporation-hating quotations the dissent has 
dredged up, it is far from clear that by the end of the 18th century corporations were 
despised.  If so, how came there to be so many of them?”). 
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1.  With No Evidence, the Majority Finds Original Intent Was to Empower 
Corporations 
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the majority, and began his 
opinion by saying that providing corporations with free speech rights simply 
reflects “ancient First Amendment principles.”73  Justice Kennedy went on to 
describe the BCRA as an outright ban on corporate political speech, a classic 
example of censorship, which does indeed violate the First Amendment.74 
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court, made many impassioned 
statements about the necessity of political speech to a free society:  
“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether 
by design or inadvertence.”75  However, the Court did acknowledge that laws 
that burden political speech are permissible if they pass a strict scrutiny test, 
i.e. if the government can prove that the regulation “furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”76  Of course, as is 
further developed in Part I.D.3 below, the majority never did find such a 
compelling interest.77 
Justice Stevens, writing on behalf of the dissenting Justices, was outraged 
by this glib invocation of our Founding Fathers and resulting manipulation 
of First Amendment jurisprudence.78  Justice Stevens discussed at great 
length his view that the Founding Fathers never would have extended 
individual rights to a corporation.79  Justice Stevens also noted that the entire 
 
 73 Id. at 886 (majority opinion) (distinguishing the majority’s handling of the BCRA’s 
limitations on corporate speech from the treatment in Austin, which the majority 
described as “a significant departure from ancient First Amendment principles” (quoting 
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 490 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) [hereinafter WRTL]) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 906 
(arguing that, although the Framers “may not have anticipated modern business and 
media corporations,” there is nevertheless “no support for the view that the First 
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech 
by media corporations”). 
 74 Id. at 888–89 (considering whether the case could be resolved on narrower, as-applied, 
grounds, and concluding that, in light of the severity of 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s limitations on 
political speech, the challenge to the statute must be evaluated on a facial 
constitutionality basis). 
 75 Id. at 898. 
 76 Id. (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 464) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77 Id. at 903–13 (rejecting a series of rationales proffered as compelling interests, 
concluding that none of these were sufficient to pass strict scrutiny). 
 78 Id. at 948–51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court invokes 
‘ancient First Amendment principles’ and original understandings to defend today’s 
ruling, yet it makes only a perfunctory attempt to ground its analysis in the principles or 
understandings of those who drafted and ratified the Amendment.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 79 Id. at 949–51 (“Unlike our colleagues, [the Framers] had little trouble distinguishing 
corporations from human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to free 
 
Jan. 2013] A CONTRACTARIAN CRITIQUE 781 
 
Bill of Rights was designed to protect individual rights (the rights of natural 
people).  In his words, there is not a “scintilla of evidence to support the 
notion that anyone believed” corporations should be given the free speech 
rights of individuals.80 
Justice Stevens discussed what the Founding Fathers would have 
understood about corporations:81  at the end of the eighteenth century there 
were only a few hundred corporations in the entire country, and each 
needed to specifically petition its local state governments for a charter that 
would entitle it to do anything at all.82  Since these corporations were very 
much at the mercy of the state for all of their rights, the notion today that 
corporations should not be subject to congressional regulation would be 
absurd to men like Thomas Jefferson.83  In Justice Stevens’s words, this 
notion is not merely a misinterpretation of the Constitution in a close case, 
but is absolutely “implausible.”84 
Here and throughout the dissent, the dissenting Justices’ ire is apparent.  
There is no hint of a healthy and respectful debate on close issues of 
constitutional interpretation.  Justice Stevens clearly seemed to believe the 
majority was manipulating the case instrumentally to achieve the partisan de-
regulatory results desired. 
Justice Stevens went on to explain that, in fact, corporations were feared 
in the early days of our nation.85  Justice Stevens cited scholars from the era 
of our Constitution’s founding, writing repeatedly that corporations were 
“soulless” and could “concentrate the worst urges of whole groups of men.”86  
In an early case from 1819, then Chief Justice Marshall (ironically cited by 
the majority for his Marbury opinion)87 wrote that, “[a] corporation is an 
 
speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they 
had in mind.”). 
 80 Id. at 948 (arguing that there is no support for the claim that the same First Amendment 
protections afforded to individuals would also insulate corporations from laws enacting 
regulatory distinctions based solely on the corporate form). 
 81 Id. at 948–51 (citing numerous secondary sources describing the treatment and 
understanding of corporations in the time of the Founders). 
 82 Id. at 949, 949 & n.53. 
 83 See id. at 949 n.54 (quoting one of Thomas Jefferson’s letters, which describes his 
apprehensions about the ultimate consequences of the rise of corporations). 
 84 Id. at 950. 
 85 Id. at 949 (noting that “widespread acceptance of business corporations as socially useful 
actors” was not the case in the Founding era, and instead “did not emerge until the 
1800’s [sic]” (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440 (2001))). 
 86 Id. at 949 (“The word ‘soulless’ constantly recurs in [Founding-era] debates over 
corporations . . . . Corporations, it was feared, could concentrate the worst urges of whole 
groups of men.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 194 (2d ed. 1985))). 
 87 Id. at 913 (majority opinion) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). 
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artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which 
the charter of its creation confers upon it.”88 
Scholarship and jurisprudence up to this day evidence the historic 
distrust of corporations described by Justice Stevens in his dissent.89  As will 
be developed further in Part II of this Article, Justice Stevens was describing 
the Founding Fathers’ understanding of the corporation, which today is 
known as the state entity theory.90  In accord with that theory, a corporation 
is not entitled to any constitutional protections; it is granted rights and 
privileges by the state that created and empowered it.91  Accordingly, it can 
also be regulated and limited by the state. 
Modern corporate scholars continue to emphasize this view of the 
corporation.92  In a recent article, Professor Hillary Sale argues that it is 
essential to conceive of a corporation as a public entity, as distinct from a 
private entity, or, for that matter, a private individual.93 
 
 88 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 89 See, e.g., Marcantel, supra note 8, at 229, 265 (reasoning that the majority in Citizens United 
must have viewed a corporation in accordance with a “real entity” theory that views a 
corporation as a natural person, and going on to argue that the drafters of the 
Constitution did not share this corporate theory, and that they would not have intended 
to “protect[] juridicial beings as real constitutional entities”). 
 90 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is, after all, but an association of 
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.  In organizing itself as 
a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body.”); see 
also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (describing corporations 
as “entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law”). 
 91 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1019–22, 1036–39 (describing the “ultra vires” or “artificial 
entity” doctrine, which “held that a [corporation] could not act contrary to the powers 
conferred on it by the state,” and going on to describe examples of that doctrine in 
Supreme Court opinions); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited:  The Development of 
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985) (contrasting corporate theories 
arguing that business associations have “an organic unity” wherein “the group was greater 
than the mere sum of its parts,” with artificial entity theory, which postulates that 
corporations are “simply artificial aggregations of individuals”).  For discussion of theo-
ries rebuking the notion of a corporation as a democracy that can be policed by its share-
holders, see infra notes 246–59. 
 92 See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 8, at 229 (arguing that the adoption of 
the Dodd-Frank Act underscores the regulatory power of the state with respect to the 
corporation and is evidence supporting the state entity theory); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Community and Statism:  A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860–61, 864–69 (1997) (book review) 
(discussing the role of government-imposed mandatory rules or default rules in 
competing corporate theories). 
 93 Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137–38 
(2011) (reviewing the Model Business Corporation Act as a starting point for a broader 
discussion of the definition of “public corporation,” and arguing that corporate directors’ 
failure to appreciate that “the government and the media have increasing influence over 
public corporations and their governance” leads to a variety of negative consequences). 
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The ever-Machiavellian Justice Scalia, writing in a concurrence with the 
majority, took on Justice Stevens’s conception of what the Founding Fathers 
would have thought about extending First Amendment protections to 
corporations.94  Justice Scalia attempted to use a textual analysis of the 
Constitution to support the notion that the Founding Fathers did indeed 
intend to empower corporations with First Amendment rights.95 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia claimed that if the Founding Fathers 
had wanted to exclude corporations from free speech rights, the First 
Amendment would have specifically said so.96  Since the First Amendment 
talks generally about Congress not abridging rights to free speech, 
corporations must be included, Scalia argued.97 
Of course, where the Constitution discusses political leaders being 
elected by “the People,” it likewise did not specifically exclude 
corporations.98  Similarly, when it discusses the qualifications a “Person” 
needs to have for certain offices, it also did not exclude corporations 
(though perhaps the requirements of attaining a certain age might suggest a 
natural person, despite a corporation being able to exist and “age” for an 
indefinite number of years).99  None of that troubled Justice Scalia.  He was, 
 
 94 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 926 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Even if we thought it proper to apply the dissent’s approach of excluding 
from First Amendment coverage what the Founders disliked, and even if we agreed that 
the Founders disliked founding-era corporations; modern corporations might not qualify 
for exclusion [from the First Amendment].”). 
 95 Id. at 926–29 (arguing that the First Amendment’s “lack of a textual exception” for 
corporations is meaningful, and that the reference to “the freedom of . . . the press” 
demonstrates that the First Amendment reaches entities other than individual Americans 
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 96 Id. (reasoning that the drafters of the First Amendment were aware that corporations 
both existed and exercised forms of speech, and that accordingly, the “lack of a textual 
exception for speech by corporations cannot be explained on the ground that such 
organizations did not exist [in the founding era] or did not speak”). 
 97 Id. at 929 (“The Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers.  Its text offers 
no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from single individuals to partnerships 
of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated associations 
of individuals—and the dissent offers no evidence about the original meaning of the text 
to support any such exclusion.”). 
 98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”). 
 99 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have 
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United 
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall 
be chosen.”); U.S. CONST., art I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not 
have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United 
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall 
be chosen.”). 
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of course, like the majority, solely focused here on “ancient First 
Amendment principles.”100 
Justice Stevens responded to Justice Scalia directly, retorting that the very 
idea of giving individual rights to a corporation was so inconceivable to the 
Founding Fathers that it would never have crossed their minds to specifically 
write into the Constitution that corporations were not entitled to individual 
rights.101 
Like Justice Stevens, scholars have also criticized the majority’s 
invocation of originalism in support of their Citizens United decision.  One 
such commentator states that the opinion “fails to persuade” that the 
Framers actually wanted to empower corporations with First Amendment 
rights.102  And that, instead, the opinion “takes us on a long journey” and 
nowhere arrives at evidence of original intent.103 
Throughout their discussion of original intent, the majority and both 
concurring opinions seemed to manipulate any true or even remotely 
accurate reading of the historical moment when the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights were drafted.  Their rhetorical description of their faithfulness 
to original noble principles is inspiring, but indeed, as Justice Stevens 
himself pointed out, appears to be completely disingenuous.104  Instead, 
original intent seemed to be used by the majority as nothing more than a 
forceful rhetorical tool put into the service of an end result:  empowering 
the corporation. 
 
100 Id. at 948 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
101 Id. at 951–52 (“If no prominent Framer bothered to articulate that corporate speech 
would have lesser status than individual speech, that may well be because the contrary 
proposition—if not also the very notion of ‘corporate speech’—was inconceivable.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
102 Amanda D. Johnson, Comment, Originalism and Citizens United:  The Struggle of Corporate 
Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187, 188 (2010) (advocating for deference to modern 
principles in cases where original intent is unclear, and concluding that Citizens United is 
such a case, wherein the majority “fails to persuade us that the Framers specifically 
intended to supply corporations with First Amendment rights to free speech”). 
103 Id. (concluding that, instead of offering persuasive evidence that the Framers’ intent was 
to extend free speech rights to corporate associations, the Citizens United majority “takes 
us on a long journey, providing a historical recitation of legislative and judicial opinion 
about corporate free speech,” and “at no time are we offered information on the 
Framers’ intent”). 
104 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The Court enlists the Framers in its defense without seriously grappling with their 
understandings of corporations or the free speech right, or with the republican principles 
that underlay those understandings.”). 
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2.  The Majority, Citing Respect for Stare Decisis, in Fact Runs Over 
Precedent 
In addition to original intent, the majority and dissent both focused on 
another crucial aspect of constitutional interpretation:  following relevant 
precedent and respecting the principle of stare decisis.105  Citing precedent, 
the majority specifically rejected the argument that corporations could or 
should be treated differently than natural people with respect to campaign 
finance restrictions.106  “Speech restrictions based on the identity of the 
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”107  In addition, 
the majority cautioned that the very act of favoring certain speakers and 
disadvantaging others might be unconstitutional.108  The majority conceded 
that some regulations that do discriminate based on the speaker have been 
upheld in past cases as constitutional.109  However, it surveyed those cases 
and found that those restrictions were all crucial to the effective functioning 
of government, an interest that, in the majority’s opinion, was not served by 
the BCRA’s general ban on corporate electioneering.110 
 
105 Id. at 886, 911–12 (majority opinion) (detailing the Court’s factors for determining 
whether to apply or reject the principle of stare decisis in a specific decision); id. at 920–
21 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that stare decisis should not be applied 
mechanically, particularly in constitutional cases); id. at 938–42 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the majority’s rationales for departing from stare 
decisis in Citizens United); see also Reza Dibadj, Citizens United as Corporate Law Narrative, 
16 NEXUS:  CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 39 (2010-2011) (arguing that the Citizens United majority 
opinion is remarkable because it pays “precious little attention to stare decisis”). 
106 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899–900 (listing precedential cases in which the Court “has 
recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations,” including in the 
specific context of political speech, and concluding that the Court “has thus rejected the 
argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated 
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural 
persons’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))). 
107 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. 
108 Id. (“Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the 
Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain 
preferred speakers.”). 
109 Id. (citing cases where the Court upheld speech restrictions “based on [a compelling] 
interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions” in the context of 
public schools, the corrections system, the military, and federal service). 
110 Id. (“The corporate independent expenditures at issue in this case [under the BCRA], 
however, would not interfere with governmental functions, so these cases [approving of 
restrictions of speech when a compelling interest in preserving governmental functions is 
present] are inapposite.”).  Despite the Court’s dismissal of this rationale as applied to 
the constitutionality of the BCRA, an argument could easily be made that the distorting 
effects of corporate electioneers directly interfere with the effective functioning of 
elections and, by extension, whether the government represents the people it governs.  
See generally James A. Gardner, Anti-regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena:  Citizens 
United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673 (2011) (exploring 
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The majority placed primary reliance on First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti to find that “corporations or other associations should [not] be 
treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such 
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”111  Decided by the Supreme Court in 
1978, Bellotti involved a state statute that restricted corporate expenditures 
related to certain referendum items.112  It is important to emphasize that the 
Bellotti case dealt not with restrictions relating to the election of politicians, 
but with general referendum items,113 issues not as likely to incite corruption 
as support for, or opposition to, specific candidates.  The Bellotti Court 
found that corporations are entitled to certain First Amendment protections 
and that the corporation did not lose the protection of that amendment 
simply because it was a corporation and not a natural person.114 
The majority used the Bellotti opinion to support the idea that no 
distinctions could ever be made between corporations and individuals with 
respect to free speech rights.115  The majority did not seem troubled by the 
fact that the issue in Bellotti and the issue in Citizens United had a crucial 
distinction.  Indeed, cases like Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce116 
(decided after Bellotti) confronted the exact issue before the Court in Citizens 
United and upheld the relevant statute.117  Those cases distinguished Bellotti 
 
the conceivable dangers to democratic self-rule and popular sovereignty that might result 
from the failure to impose campaign speech and spending regulation). 
111 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776). 
112 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767–68 (“The statute at issue [. . .] prohibits [. . .] corporations[] from 
making contributions or expenditures for the purpose of [. . .] influencing or affecting 
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any 
of the property, business or assets of the corporation.” (footnote omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
113 Id. at 767 (describing the Massachusetts statute at issue as “a state criminal statute that 
forbids certain expenditures by banks and business corporations for the purpose of 
influencing the vote on referendum proposals”). 
114 Id. at 784 (“We thus find no support in the First . . . Amendment, or in the decisions of 
this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection 
of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a 
corporation . . . .”) 
115 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (employing the Bellotti Court’s premise that the First 
Amendment’s protection of political speech “does not depend on the identity of its 
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
at 777) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
116 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that, like the 
BCRA, prohibited corporations from spending corporate treasury funds on 
electioneering communications), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
117 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990) (holding that the 
statute at issue passed strict scrutiny, because it was “narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest,” and describing the effect of the statute as “prohibit[ing] 
corporations from making contributions and independent expenditures in connection 
with state candidate elections”); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 
(2003). 
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because the restriction in Bellotti related to referendum items, items not 
likely to incite corruption, and not individual politicians seeking office.118 
The Citizens United majority also relied on Buckley v. Valeo.119  In Buckley—
which was decided in 1976, just two years before Bellotti—the Court 
confronted a limit on independent expenditures from individuals as well as 
corporations and unions.120  The Buckley Court found that regulation to be 
an unconstitutional burden on free speech since the Court reasoned that 
the regulation did not serve any compelling purpose in combating quid pro 
quo corruption.121 
However, the Buckley Court did not confront the separate question of 
whether restrictions on independent expenditures coming only from 
corporations or unions would be unconstitutional.122  Nonetheless, the 
Citizens United majority cited to Buckley for the proposition that if such a 
restriction were to be challenged (as it was in Citizens United), the reasoning 
in Buckley could not support it.123  In other words, Buckley did not confront 
 
118 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26, for the proposition that the 
Court has “recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent 
corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to influence 
candidate elections,” as opposed to the less serious referendum context at issue in 
Bellotti).  In fact, the Bellotti opinion “squarely disavowed the proposition for which the 
majority cites it” in Citizens United, i.e. that corporations and unions could not be treated 
differently from individuals for purposes of campaign regulation.  Citizens United, 130 S. 
Ct. at 958 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
119 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
120 Id. at 7 (“The statutes at issue summarized in broad terms, contain the following 
provisions:  (a) individual political contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single 
candidate per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; 
independent expenditures by individuals and groups ‘relative to a clearly identified 
candidate’ are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign spending by candidates for various 
federal offices and spending for national conventions by political parties are subject to 
prescribed limits; (b) contributions and expenditures above certain threshold levels must 
be reported and publicly disclosed; (c) a system for public funding of Presidential 
campaign activities is established by Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code; and (d) a 
Federal Election Commission is established to administer and enforce the legislation.”). 
121 Id. at 45 (finding that even “assuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures 
pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large 
contributions, [the statute in question] does not provide an answer that sufficiently 
relates to the elimination of those dangers,” because it did not establish a total ban on 
large expenditures and so did not sufficiently eliminate the potential danger of undue 
influence, because an enterprising person could devise independent expenditures that 
circumvent the regulation’s restrictions). 
122 Id. at 29 n.31 (“The Act places no limit on the number of funds that may be formed 
through the use of subsidiaries or divisions of corporations, or of local and regional units 
of a national labor union.”). 
123 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (“Buckley did not consider [FECA] § 610’s separate ban on 
corporate and union independent expenditures . . . . Had [FECA] § 610 been challenged 
in the wake of Buckley, however, it could not have been squared with the reasoning and 
analysis of that precedent.”). 
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the same question that the Citizens United Court was confronting, but the 
majority relied on Buckley nonetheless, because the reasoning alone in that 
case suggested to them that the BCRA should be ruled unconstitutional.124 
As mentioned above, two cases decided after Bellotti and Buckley actually 
did take up questions that were essentially identical to the issue presented in 
Citizens United.  The majority cited and discussed those subsequent cases, 
Austin125 and McConnell v. FEC.126  The majority found that those cases were 
simply not in accord with the First Amendment jurisprudence of Bellotti and 
Buckley, despite the fact that the Courts in those cases had found their 
resolution of the cases to be entirely consonant with Bellotti and Buckley.127  
But the majority in Citizens United simply disagreed, and thus the relevant 
parts of those cases (Austin completely and McConnell in part) were 
overruled as aberrations.128 
In Austin, decided approximately twenty years before Citizens United, the 
Court confronted a Michigan state statute restricting independent 
expenditures by corporations supporting or opposing political candidates.129  
Austin upheld the restriction on corporations, reasoning that corporate 
electioneering could have a corrupting and distorting effect on elections.130  
Thus, the regulations in question were justified and passed constitutional 
 
124 Id. at 908 (citing Buckley’s proposition that the governmental interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption is insufficient as applied to independent 
expenditures because of its chilling effect on speech and the lessened potential for 
corruption involved in independent expenditures). 
125 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 913; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 116–18. 
126 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct at 913. 
127 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912–15 (rejecting Austin as “contraven[ing] this Court’s 
earlier precedents in Buckley and Bellotti” and accordingly overruling “the part of 
McConnell that upheld BCRA § 203’s extension of [2 U.S.C.] § 441b’s restrictions on 
corporate independent expenditures”); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122 (distinguishing Buckley 
because that case “addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and 
expenditures by individuals, since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on 
contributions by corporations and labor unions”); Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (identifying 
support in Buckley and Bellotti for the propositions that, although the Court “has 
distinguished [independent] expenditures from direct [campaign] contributions, [. . .] it 
has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of real or apparent 
corruption” from corporate independent expenditures) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 
n.26; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47). 
128 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
129 Austin, 494 U.S. at 655–56. 
130 Id. at 661 (“Although some closely held corporations, just as some publicly held ones, 
may not have accumulated significant amounts of wealth, they receive from the State the 
special benefits conferred by the corporate structure and present the potential for 
distorting the political process.  This potential for distortion justifies [the statute’s] 
general applicability to all corporations.”). 
Jan. 2013] A CONTRACTARIAN CRITIQUE 789 
 
scrutiny.131  McConnell, decided seven years before Citizens United, scrutinized 
the very same statute under consideration in Citizens United:  the BCRA.132  
The McConnell Court relied on Austin to uphold restrictions on corporate 
electioneering based in part on the potential for such electioneering to 
corrupt and distort elections.133 
One of the primary criticisms leveled by Justice Stevens’s Citizens United 
dissent (and by President Obama)134 was that the majority of the Court 
overturned a century of precedent allowing for regulations of corporations 
in the area of corporate finance.135  Well-known constitutional law scholar 
Laurence Tribe has written that the Citizens United opinion shows that the 
Roberts Court has no “genuine concern with adherence to precedent.”136 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that “[t]he final principle of judicial 
process that the majority violates is the most transparent:  stare decisis.”137  
Indeed, as just discussed, the majority specifically overturned Austin and that 
portion of McConnell that upheld the BCRA’s regulation of corporate 
electioneering.138  However, the Citizens United majority was also clear that 
Austin and part of McConnell were the only cases that needed to be 
overturned.139  As both cases were decided within the past twenty years, in 
 
131 Id. at 666 (“[W]e hold that [the Michigan statute] does not violate the First 
Amendment . . . .”). 
132 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114 (“In this opinion we discuss Titles I and II of BCRA.”). 
133 Id. at 205 (“We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at the corrosive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.” (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
134 See Obama, supra note 26, at 8 (“[T]he Supreme Court reversed a century of law [in 
Citizens United]  . . . .”). 
135 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 940 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although the majority opinion spends 
several pages making these surprising arguments [in favor of overruling precedent in 
Citizens United], it says almost nothing about the standard considerations we have used to 
determine stare decisis value, such as the antiquity of the precedent, the workability of its 
legal rule, and the reliance interests at stake.  It is also conspicuously silent about 
McConnell, even though the McConnell Court’s decision to uphold BCRA § 203 relied not 
only on the antidistortion logic of Austin but also on the statute’s historical 
pedigree . . . .”). 
136 Laurence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG, (Jan. 
24, 2010, 10:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=15469 (“There is no doubt that 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission . . . signals the end of whatever legitimate 
claim could otherwise have been made by the Roberts Court to . . . a genuine concern 
with adherence to precedent.”). 
137 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 938 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
138 See supra note 128. 
139 Cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (majority opinion) (overruling Austin and overruling 
McConnell in part, and then concluding that the BCRA could then be considered 
unconstitutional). 
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the majority’s view, its action was not a denouncement of a century of 
regulation but rather a correction of relatively recent case law that was an 
aberration.140 
With expressed deference to precedent, the Citizens United majority 
reiterated its previous position that “[s]tare decisis is a principle of policy and 
not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”141  The Court 
made clear that it would respect precedent unless respecting precedent put 
it “on a course that is sure error.”142  Again stressing the importance of free 
political speech and the right of all people to speak and also to hear every 
political message that they choose to, the Court found Austin and McConnell 
to represent unsustainable infringements on First Amendment rights, 
despite its proclaimed respect for precedent.143 
Justice Stevens lambasted the majority, explaining in clear and harsh 
terms why stare decisis is so crucial, and then arguing that the majority 
violated the principle by ignoring a century of precedent in order to reach 
the result it desired in this case.144  Justice Stevens cited laws and cases that 
were more than one hundred years old to support the notion that 
corporations could be treated differently than individuals for free speech 
purposes in the context of elections.145  He cited the Tillman Act of 1907 as 
banning all corporate contributions to candidates.146  The debate revolving 
around the passage of that Act more than one hundred years ago discussed 
the enormous power of corporations and both the actual and perceived 
corrupting effects corporations have on elections.147  The Taft-Hartley Act of 
 
140 Id. at 903 (identifying two “conflicting lines of precedent:  a pre-Austin line that forbids 
restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-
Austin line that permits them”). 
141 Id. at 912 (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
142 Id. at 911–12 (“Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons 
demonstrates that adherence to it put us on a course that is sure error.”). 
143 Id. at 912–13. 
144 Id. at 938–42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the 
majority for its failure to adequately justify its departure from precedent). 
145 Id. at 952–54 (identifying an “express distinction between corporate and individual 
political spending on elections” that “stretches back to 1907, when Congress passed the 
Tillman Act,” and also referring to the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971). 
146 Id. at 952–53. 
147 See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C 
§ 441b (2006)) (prohibiting campaign contributions by corporations); see also Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. at 952–53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[T]he evils of the use of [corporate] money in connection with political elections are so 
generally recognized that the committee deems it unnecessary to make any argument in 
favor of the general purpose of this measure.  It is in the interest of good government and 
calculated to promote purity in the selection of public officials.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 
3056, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1906)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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1947 enacted restrictions on indirect corporate expenditures on elections.148  
Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to restrict the 
general use of corporate money for contributions and expenditures, again 
out of a fear of the corrupting influence corporations can have on 
elections.149 
In addition to those legislative acts, Justice Stevens of course discussed 
Austin and McConnell, the cases the majority deemed to have been resolved 
incorrectly.150  Suddenly, argued Justice Stevens, the majority had decided 
that corporations should not be regulated differently than individuals in this 
context of campaign finance.151  According to Justice Stevens, the majority’s 
decision lie in stark contrast to more than one hundred years of precedent 
and practice152 and the rhetoric that somehow the BCRA diminished the 
constitutional right to free speech was simply that—rhetoric.  The majority’s 
decision to fly in the face of stare decisis and established precedent “comes 
down to nothing more than its disagreement with [the law and those 
cases].”153 
Justice Stevens discussed the reliance aspects of stare decisis.  He 
explained that individuals and politicians all rely on stare decisis to shape 
their behavior.154  Individuals behave in accord with the new case law.155  
 
148 The primary focus being unions.  See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“Taft-
Hartley Act”), Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60 (1947) (banning political 
contributions, including independent expenditures, by labor organizations); Allison R. 
Hayward, Revisiting the Fable of Reform, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 421, 448, 456–63 (2008) 
(examining the development and effect of the Taft-Hartley Act, with a particular focus on 
the expenditure ban in § 304, and characterizing the Act as “anti-union legislation”); 
Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1130 & n.108 (2002) (noting that the Taft-
Hartley Act was amended to apply to unions). 
149 See generally The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), Pub. L. No. 92–225, 86 
Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 (2006)); FECA Amendments 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1239, at 120, 
131 (1974) (relying on the Watergate Scandal to justify greater congressional involvement 
to prevent campaign finance corruption). 
150 See generally Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 938–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing both cases extensively). 
151 Id. at 960–61 (“Time and again, we have recognized these realities in approving measures 
that Congress and the States have taken.  None of the cases the majority cites is to the 
contrary.  The only thing new about Austin was the dissent, with its stunning failure to 
appreciate the legitimacy of interests recognized in the name of democratic integrity 
since the days of the Progressives.”). 
152 Id. (identifying a line of campaign finance precedent upholding corporate regulation 
that has existed “[c]ontinuously for over 100 years”). 
153 Id. at 941–42 (“[T]he Court’s rejection of Austin and McConnell comes down to nothing 
more than its disagreement with their results.”). 
154 Id. at 940 (“We have recognized that [s]tare decisis has special force when legislators or 
citizens have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the 
decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative 
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Lawmakers fashion subsequent regulations within the parameters of prior 
decisions.156  In this specific case, Justice Stevens pointed out that Congress 
had developed a record 100,000 pages long when it debated the BCRA and 
that all of those discussions, compromises, and solutions were in reliance on 
the settled precedent of Austin.157  The dialogue between the branches of 
government is not to be taken lightly.158  Justice Stevens described the 
overruling of Austin and the relevant part of McConnell as “[p]ulling out the 
rug beneath Congress.”159  Justice Stevens went on to describe the majority’s 
behavior as “procedural dereliction.”160 
In its opinion, the majority appealed to one of the primary tools of 
constitutional interpretation, looking to precedent and respecting the 
principle of stare decisis.161  It paid deference to those principles, but, of 
course, in this case found an exception and overruled the well-established 
precedent cases Austin and McConnell.162  It ignored legislation regulating 
corporations that has been passed periodically for over a hundred years.163  It 
relied on strained interpretations of cases from the 1970s, Bellotti and 
Buckley, to support its decision, despite the fact that those cases did not 
confront the same question as the one presented in Citizens United.164  Austin 
 
response.” (alteration in original) (quoting Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
155 Id. (“Stare decisis protects not only personal rights involving property or contract but also 
the ability of the elected branches to shape their laws in an effective and coherent 
fashion.”). 
156 Id. (“State legislatures have relied on their authority to regulate corporate electioneering, 
confirmed in Austin, for more than a century.” (footnote omitted)). 
157 Id. (“The Federal Congress has relied on this authority [to regulate corporate 
electioneering under Supreme Court precedent prior to Citizens United] for a comparable 
stretch of time, and it specifically relied on Austin throughout the years it spent 
developing and debating BCRA.  The total record it compiled was 100,000 pages long.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
158 Cf. id. (“Pulling out the rug beneath Congress after affirming the constitutionality of 
[BCRA] § 203 six years ago shows great disrespect for a coequal branch.”). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 942 (“The novelty of the Court’s procedural dereliction and its approach to stare 
decisis is matched by the novelty of its ruling on the merits.”). 
161 See id. at 911–12 (majority opinion) (noting the importance of stare decisis and 
describing the various considerations that inform the decision whether or not to deviate 
from stare decisis in a specific case). 
162 Id. at 913. 
163 See id. at 960 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that laws 
regulating corporate participation in candidate elections have been enacted 
“[c]ontinuously for over 100 years,” in response to “documented threats to electoral 
integrity” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 522 
(2007) (Souter, J., dissenting))). 
164 See id. at 958–61 (distinguishing Buckley from Citizens United by explaining that Buckley 
“focused on a very different statutory provision” that does not map onto the independent 
expenditure ban at hand in Citizens United, and distinguishing Bellotti as adjudicating the 
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and McConnell, the cases the majority overruled, did confront the same 
question.165  The majority went out of its way to overturn those cases and the 
principle of stare decisis in order to empower the corporation. 
3.  The Majority Finds No Interest Sufficient to Limit a Corporation’s Free 
Speech 
Of course, as mentioned briefly above, the Citizens United majority did 
acknowledge that some restrictions on First Amendment freedom of speech 
are permissible.166  The jurisprudential test that has evolved to balance the 
constitutional interest against the interest promoted by the regulation is the 
strict scrutiny test.167  Under that test, the government must prove that the 
regulation “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest.”168 
The FEC’s defense of the BCRA built on the Austin case, which 
acknowledged that three interests were sufficient to support regulating 
corporations in the campaign finance area.169  Those interests are 
anticorruption, antidistortion, and, perhaps most importantly for our 
inquiry into the nature of a corporation, shareholder protection.170  The 
majority of the Citizens United Court considered those rationales and rejected 
all three of them in concert with the overturning of Austin and part of 
McConnell.171  With no compelling interest left to support the BCRA, the 
Court reasoned that the regulation did not pass strict scrutiny.172 
 
validity of “a state statute that barred business corporations’ expenditures on some 
referenda but not others”). 
165 See id. at 960 (noting that Austin and McConnell hold that a compelling state interest exists 
in regulating corporate expenditures to political activity). 
166 Id. at 899 (majority opinion) (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions 
that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an 
interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”). 
167 See id. at 898 (“Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny[]’ . . .” 
(quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 464)). 
168 Id. (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 464) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169 Id. at 903 (acknowledging the Government’s reliance on the antidistortion rationale from 
Austin, as well as the anticorruption interest and shareholder-protection interests in its 
argument supporting corporate-speech restrictions). 
170 Id. 
171 See id. at 904–11 (rejecting the antidistortion rationale from Austin, the anticorruption 
rationale from Buckley, and the shareholder-protection rationale, with the result of 
overturning Austin and a portion of McConnell). 
172 See id. at 913 (overruling Austin and the part of McConnell that had upheld BCRA § 203). 
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a.  Anticorruption 
The majority discussed these three rationales relatively briefly, 
considering the expanse of its opinion.  With respect to corruption, the 
majority reviewed relevant cases that discussed corruption and determined 
that those cases essentially acknowledged that safeguarding against quid pro 
quo corruption was a sufficient purpose to allow for some limitations on free 
speech.173  The majority specifically relied on Buckley in this regard.174  The 
Buckley Court upheld limitations on direct contributions to candidates, 
reasoning that there the possibility of quid pro quo corruption was sufficient 
to justify the limitations.175  However, the Buckley Court struck down limits on 
electioneering that applied to corporations, unions, and individuals alike.176  
With respect to those electioneering limitations, the Buckley Court found 
that there was no reason to assume that quid pro quo corruption was at risk 
with electioneering since there is no arrangement with a candidate in 
advance.177  Thus, the Buckley Court struck down that limitation on free 
speech as not being justified by the anticorruption rationale.178  It bears 
repeating, however, that the electioneering restriction struck down in 
Buckley applied not only to entities like corporations and unions, but also to 
individuals.  Thus, the Buckley case is distinguishable from the Citizens United 
case, where no individual’s right to free speech was at stake at all.  Austin and 
McConnell both recognized this distinction and were able to uphold 
restrictions on corporations, consonant with Buckley.179 
 
173 Id. at 908 (pointing to the Court’s finding in Buckley that the anticorruption interest was 
“‘sufficiently important’ to allow limits on contributions. . . .” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976))). 
174 See, e.g., id. at 901–02, 908–10 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1). 
175 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27 (“It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose—
to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual 
financial contributions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the 
$1,000 contribution limitation. . . . To the extent that large contributions are given to 
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of 
our system of representative democracy is undermined.”). 
176 Id. at 45 (“We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify [FECA] § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on 
independent expenditures. . . . [Even] assuming, arguendo, that large independent 
expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as 
do large contributions, § 608(e)(1) does not provide an answer that sufficiently relates to 
the elimination of these dangers.”). 
177 Id. at 47 (“The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the 
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the 
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo 
for improper commitments from the candidate.”). 
178 Id. at 45 (“[T]he governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption is inadequate to justify § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on independent expenditures.”). 
179 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003) (“Our opinion in Buckley 
addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by individuals, 
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The Citizens United majority also relied on Bellotti as standing for the idea 
that speech should not be restricted based on the identity of the speaker, 
regardless of the specter of corruption.180  Once again, though, the Citizens 
United majority glossed over the fact that the restriction on electioneering in 
the Bellotti case related only to referendum items, arguably issues where 
corruption would be less likely than electioneering related directly to a 
political candidate.181  The Citizens United majority did acknowledge that a 
footnote in the Bellotti case left open the possibility that corporate 
electioneering could, in fact, lead to corruption.182  However, the Citizens 
United majority quickly dismissed the significance of that footnote and 
returned to its reliance on Buckley.183  The Court overlooked once again the 
distinction that the regulation at stake in the Buckley case also was regulating 
independent expenditures by individuals.184 
The majority then went on to reason that there is simply no evidence 
that general independent expenditures could lead to corruption or its 
 
since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on contributions by corporations 
and labor unions.” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 n.31)); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 138 (“Like 
the contribution limits we upheld in Buckley, [the restrictions in the statute at issue] have 
only a marginal impact on the ability of contributors, candidates, officeholders, and 
parties to engage in effective political speech.”); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (“Although this Court has distinguished [independent] 
expenditures from direct contributions in the context of federal laws regulating 
individual donors, it has also recognized that a legislature might demonstrate a danger of 
real or apparent corruption posed by such expenditures when made by corporations to 
influence candidate elections . . . .” (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47)), overruled by Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. 913; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 957–60 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court’s decisions in Buckley and Bellotti 
are consistent with Austin and McConnell). 
180 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (majority opinion) (“Bellotti reaffirmed the First 
Amendment principle that the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the 
speaker’s corporate identity.” (citation omitted)). 
181 See id. at 958–59 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The 
anticorruption interests that animate regulations of corporate participation in candidate 
elections . . . do not apply equally to regulations of corporate participation in 
referenda.”). 
182 Id. at 909 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that a “footnote in Bellotti purported to 
leave open the possibility that corporate independent expenditures could be shown to 
cause corruption” (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 
(1978))). 
183 Id. (dismissing the importance of Bellotti by arguing that the Bellotti footnote is “dictum” 
that “is thus supported only by a law review student comment, which misinterpreted 
Buckley”) (citation omitted). 
184 See id. at 958 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing Buckley’s 
holding as “evaluating ‘the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative 
ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections’” and explaining 
that, despite the majority’s reliance on Buckley, “[i]t is not apparent why this is relevant to 
the case before us” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48)); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122 
(“Our opinion in Buckley addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and 
expenditures by individuals . . . .”). 
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appearance.185  The majority surmised that there was no valid interest in 
eliminating corruption that could justify the supposedly drastic limitation on 
the corporation’s constitutional right to free speech.186 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens lambasted the majority’s “crabbed view of 
corruption.”187  Justice Stevens wrote sarcastically to say that the rhetoric of 
the majority’s opinion had some appeal, but that it did not even begin to 
approach the reality of the political arena.188  The majority argued the 
simple platitude that more free speech is always better and that our citizenry 
and our democracy depend on the ability to both deliver and to hear 
political messages.189  The majority confined corruption to clear examples of 
quid pro quo corruption and submitted that only such clear examples of 
corruption should be allowed to interfere with the right to free speech.190 
Justice Stevens accused the majority’s approach to corruption of lacking 
of any serious analysis.191  Justice Stevens cited to the district court’s opinion 
in McConnell, written by Judge Kollar-Kotelly.192  That opinion discussed the 
subtleties of corruption and the evidence that electioneering involves 
 
185 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (majority opinion) (claiming that “there is only scant 
evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate”). 
186 See id. at 911 (“When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding due 
deference; but Congress may not choose an unconstitutional remedy.  If elected officials 
succumb to improper influences from independent expenditures; if they surrender their 
best judgment; and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for 
concern.  We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the 
appearance or the reality of these influences.  The remedies enacted by law, however, 
must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more 
speech, not less, is the governing rule.  An outright ban on corporate political speech 
during the critical preelection period is not a permissible remedy.”). 
187 Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting McConnell, 540 
U.S. at 152) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 Id. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Today’s decision is 
backwards in many senses. It elevates the majority’s agenda over the litigants’ 
submissions, facial attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories over 
narrow statutory grounds, individual dissenting opinions over precedential holdings, 
assertion over tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality.”). 
189 Id. at 911 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is our law and our tradition that more speech, not 
less, is the governing rule.”); see also id. at 904 (“Political speech is indispensable to 
decisionmaking in a democracy . . . .” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 777 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
190 See id. at 901–09, (identifying the original support for the anticorruption interest as 
“concern that large contributions could be given to secure a political quid pro quo,” and 
arguing that independent expenditures do not create sufficient risk of quid pro quo 
corruption to justify a limitation on political speech (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 435 U.S. 1, 
26 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
191 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Rather than show any deference to a coordinate branch of Government, the majority 
thus rejects the anticorruption rationale without serious analysis.”). 
192 Id. at 961–62, 966 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555–
60, 622–25 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
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indirect forms of influence peddling.193  Judge Kollar-Kotelly had found that 
politicians routinely request corporations to make electioneering 
communications so that the politicians themselves do not have to engage in 
disseminating certain messages.194  She also discovered that politicians 
routinely communicate with corporations to thank them for distributing 
those messages.195  In addition, she found that a vast portion of the American 
public—80%—believe that corporations get paybacks for engaging in 
political electioneering.196  One lobbyist had even testified that indirect 
expenditures generate more influence with politicians than direct 
contributions.197  That testimony went uncontroverted.198 
In addition to citing Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s findings, Justice Stevens also 
cited to the voluminous legislative record—more than 100,000 pages—
supporting the electioneering restriction that was under consideration.199  
 
193 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24 (“The factual findings of the Court illustrate that 
corporations and labor unions routinely notify Members of Congress as soon as they air 
electioneering communications relevant to the members’ elections.  The record also 
indicates that Members express appreciation to the organizations for airing these 
election-related advertisements.” (citation omitted)); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961–63, 
966 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In a careful analysis, Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly made numerous findings about the corrupting consequences of corporate 
and union independent expenditures in the years preceding BCRA’s passage.” (citing 
McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 555–60)). 
194 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (“Members of Congress are particularly grateful when 
negative issue advertisements are run by these organizations, leaving the candidates free 
to run positive advertisements and be seen as ‘above the fray.’ . . . The Findings also 
demonstrate that Members of Congress seek to have corporations and unions run these 
advertisements on their behalf.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 962 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24). 
195 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (noting that Members of Congress “express 
appreciation to organizations for the airing of” electioneering communications); see also 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961–62 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24). 
196 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24 (“Finally, a large majority of Americans (80%) are 
of the view that corporations and other organizations that engage in electioneering 
communications, which benefit specific elected officials, receive special consideration 
from these officials when matters arise that affect those corporations and 
organizations.”); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 962 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24). 
197 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (“[U]nregulated expenditures—whether soft money 
donations to the parties or issue ad campaigns—can sometimes generate far more 
influence than direct campaign contributions.” (internal citations omitted)); see also 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 966 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 556). 
198 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (“Plaintiffs have put forth no contrary evidence to rebut 
the testimony of these consultants and lobbyist.”); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 966 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 
2d at 556). 
199 Id. at 940 (citing David B. Magleby, The Importance of the Record in McConnell v. FEC, 3 
ELECTION L.J. 285 (2004)). 
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Congress had studied the issue and concluded that corporations involved in 
electioneering were routinely granted more access to politicians, and gained 
favor with them.200  Somehow, those findings of Judge Kollar-Kotelly and of 
Congress were not sufficient for the majority. 
b.  Antidistortion 
The Citizens United majority confronted the antidistortion rationale.201  
That rationale was developed clearly in the Austin case.202  As mentioned 
above, in Austin a Michigan statute forbade corporate electioneering 
designed to support or denounce any particular political candidate.203  The 
Austin Court ruled that the massive accumulation of wealth in a corporation 
can have a distorting effect on elections.204  Preventing that distortion was 
sufficient justification to support the statute, despite its limitation on 
corporate free speech.205 
The Citizens United majority considered this antidistortion rationale and 
rejected it.206  The majority stressed the importance of a democratic right to 
free speech and reasoned that simply because people came together to form 
an association in the form of a corporation, those people should not have 
their fundamental rights to free speech trampled.207 
The majority also addressed the notion that the corporation uses funds 
accumulated for other purposes and may not accurately reflect the views of 
 
200 Id. at 961, 966 (noting that “the record Congress developed in passing BCRA” is “a 
remarkable testament to the energy and ingenuity with which corporations, unions, 
lobbyists, and politicians may go about scratching each other’s backs”). 
201 Id. at 904–08 (majority opinion) (rejecting the proposition that the government can 
legitimately restrict speech in order to equalize the influence of individuals and groups 
over elections). 
202 Id. at 904 (describing that interest as “Austin’s antidistortion rationale”); see also Austin v. 
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (“We find that the Act is 
precisely targeted to eliminate the distortion caused by corporate spending while also 
allowing corporations to express their political views.”), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. 
Ct. at 913. 
203 Austin, 494 U.S. at 655–56. 
204 Id. at 668–69 (“[T]he Michigan Campaign Finance Act reduces the threat that huge 
corporate treasuries amassed with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influence 
unfairly the outcome of elections.”). 
205 Id. at 659–60 (upholding the constitutionality of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act). 
206 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904–08 (evaluating and eventually rejecting the antidistortion 
rationale as an insufficient interest to support the BCRA under strict scrutiny). 
207 Id. at 904 (“If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or 
jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.  If the 
antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to 
ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on the 
corporate form.”). 
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its shareholders.208  Instead, corporate electioneering is likely to distort or 
even controvert the views of its shareholders.209  The majority found this idea 
to be without merit, arguing that all political speakers fund their speech 
through some market mechanism.210  It is simply unacceptable to use that 
argument to restrict free speech, or all free speech could be so regulated.211 
The majority also argued that the antidistortion rationale could enable 
possible restrictions on media corporations, which obviously have a potential 
to distort public opinion.212  Such restrictions on the media would simply 
also be unacceptable in our democracy.213  It is interesting to note, however, 
that restrictions on media corporations were specifically carved out of the 
regulation under consideration in Citizens United.214  Thus, again, the 
majority was taking up a concern that was not presented by the case at hand. 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens was again adamant that the majority 
approach had ignored reality, experience, and the empirical research upon 
which Congress based its decision to pass the BCRA.215  Here Justice Stevens 
actually did consider the nature of a corporation and its difference from 
natural people.216  He was again sarcastic with the majority, claiming that it 
seemed not to notice that difference at all.217  He stated that “corporations 
 
208 Id. at 911 (rejecting these notions and asserting that there is “little evidence of abuse that 
cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy’” 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978))). 
209 See id. at 953, 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“When 
corporations use general treasury funds to praise or attack a particular candidate for 
office, it is the shareholders, as the residual claimants, who are effectively footing the bill.  
Those shareholders who disagree with the corporation’s electoral message may find their 
financial investments being used to undermine their political convictions.”). 
210 Id. at 884 (majority opinion) (“All speakers, including individuals and the media, use 
money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First 
Amendment protects the resulting speech.”). 
211 Id. at 905–06 (describing the logical ramifications of accepting the antidistortion 
principle, and concluding that, if accepted, that principle would allow widespread 
suppression of political speech). 
212 Id. (“Austin’s antidistortion rationale would produce the dangerous, and unacceptable, 
consequence that Congress could ban political speech of media corporations.”). 
213 Id. at 886, 906–08 (“Differential treatment of media corporations and other corporations 
cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that 
the Amendment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corporations’ 
political speech.”). 
214 Id. at 943–44 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Like numerous 
statutes, [the BCRA] exempts media companies’ news stories, commentaries, and 
editorials from its electioneering restrictions, in recognition of the unique role played by 
the institutional press in sustaining public debate.” (footnote omitted)). 
215 Id. at 971–75 (defending the antidistortion rationale as support for the BCRA). 
216 Id. at 971–72 (listing a series of characteristics that distinguish individual people from 
corporations). 
217 Id. at 975 n.74, 976 (“The majority seems oblivious to the simple truth . . . .”). 
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have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”218  He 
argued that corporations “are not themselves members of ‘We the People’ 
by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”219  Further, 
corporations are able to amass large amounts of resources in their treasury 
“war chests,” but a corporation’s accumulation of capital has very little, if 
anything, to do with the political proclivities of its constituents—including 
investors and customers.220  Moreover, because a corporation’s mission is 
centered on making profits, any electoral message that might advance that 
mission may indeed be antithetical to the political proclivities of the 
corporation’s constituents.221 
Because of the power and influence of corporations in our marketplace, 
corporations could come to dominate our elections and indeed our 
democracy.222  This domination might diminish the inclination of citizens to 
feel vested in the political process at all.223  It may, in fact, leave citizens 
(rightly or wrongly) feeling completely disenfranchised and incapable of 
meaningfully disciplining elected officials.224  Justice Stevens was again 
caustic with the majority and described the majority’s approach to this 
antidistortion rational as “facile” and one that simply “assumes away all of 
these complexities.”225 
 
218 Id. at 972. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 971 (“The resources in the treasury of a business corporation, furthermore, are not 
an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas.” (quoting Austin v. 
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. 
Ct., at 913 (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
221 Id. at 974, 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The structure of a 
business corporation, furthermore, draws a line between the corporation’s economic 
interests and the political preferences of the individuals associated with the corporation; 
the corporation must engage the electoral process with the aim ‘to enhance the 
profitability of the company, no matter how persuasive the arguments for a broader or 
conflicting set of priorities.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae 
American Independent Business Alliance in Support of Appellee on Supplemental 
Question, at 11, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (Jul. 31, 2009) (No. 08-205))). 
222 Id. at 974 (“Corporate domination of electioneering can generate the impression that 
corporations dominate our democracy.” (citation omitted) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 
659) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
223 Id. (“The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment:  an increased perception 
that large spenders ‘call the tune’ and a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in 
democratic governance.’” (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 U.S. 93, 144 
(2003))). 
224 Id. at 974–75 (“[U]nregulated corporate electioneering might diminish the ability of 
citizens to ‘hold officials accountable to the people.’” (citing id. at 898 (majority 
opinion))). 
225 Id. at 975. 
Jan. 2013] A CONTRACTARIAN CRITIQUE 801 
 
c.  Shareholder Protection 
The Citizens United majority also considered a shareholder protection 
rationale as being insufficient to support the regulation on corporate 
speech.226  The shareholder protection rationale was partly described above 
in Justice Stevens’s reaction to the majority’s antidistortion arguments.227  
Shareholders do not typically invest in corporations to make political 
statements.228  When a corporation then takes general corporate funds to 
advance a particular political issue, it is not speaking for its shareholders but 
for the officers or directors who made the decision to engage in the political 
speech.229  Thus, restrictions on that type of electioneering in fact protect 
shareholders from funding the political interests of their corporation’s 
managers.230  Even assuming that corporate managers are solely acting to 
advance the interests of the corporation, the political message still would not 
reflect the political beliefs of each of the corporation’s shareholders.231 
The majority dismissed this shareholder protection rationale out of 
hand, explaining that such a rationale could again lead to restrictions on the 
free speech of media corporations (despite the fact that once again such 
restrictions were not at stake in this case).232  Thus, the Court said, this 
slippery slope of permitting such regulations is simply an unacceptable 
limitation on the free speech enshrined by the First Amendment.233 
 
226 Id. at 911 (majority opinion) (finding “sufficient” reasons “to reject this shareholder-
protection interest”). 
227 Id. at 971, 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining the 
corporate motivation and obligation to enhance profits). 
228 Id. at 977–78 (noting that there is a governmental interest in safeguarding “individuals 
who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of 
candidates” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l. Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 
207–09 (1982))). 
229 Cf. id. at 972 (“Perhaps the officers or directors of the corporation have the best claim to 
be the ones speaking . . . .”). 
230 Id. at 977 (“Interwoven with Austin’s concern to protect the integrity of the electoral 
process is a concern to protect the rights of shareholders from a kind of coerced speech:  
electioneering expenditures that do not reflect their support.” (quoting Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660–61 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. 
Ct. at 913) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
231 Cf. id. (noting that the political speech initiated by corporate directors is likely to be 
misaligned with the political preferences of at least some shareholders). 
232 Id. at 911 (majority opinion) (“The Government contends further that corporate 
independent expenditures can be limited because of its interest in protecting dissenting 
shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political speech.  This asserted 
interest, like Austin’s antidistortion rationale, would allow the Government to ban the 
political speech even of media corporations.”). 
233 Cf. id. at 905–08 (arguing that a statute that potentially restricts media corporation speech 
is unacceptable under the First Amendment). 
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The majority continued its argument, saying that the BCRA was both too 
broad and too narrow to withstand strict scrutiny.234  The BCRA is too broad 
because there are narrower measures the government could have enacted to 
protect shareholders from indirectly funding political messages that conflict 
with their own.235  The BCRA is too narrow for at least two reasons.  First, 
media corporations are exempted.236  Thus, shareholders in those 
corporations are left unprotected.237  Second, the electioneering restrictions 
are only in effect for certain relatively short timeframes before an election.238  
If shareholders need protection, then surely they need protection beyond 
just those limited time periods.239 
Justice Stevens for the dissent again took on the majority and argued that 
the regulation under consideration in this case, the BCRA, in fact 
“protect[s] the rights of shareholders from a kind of coerced speech:  
electioneering expenditures that do not reflect their support.”240  Justice 
Stevens argued that this shareholder protection rationale was considered 
and endorsed by Congress in its enactments that extend back more than a 
hundred years to the Tillman Act.241 
Justice Stevens went on to consider the majority’s argument that 
corporate democracy should function in a way that already protects the 
shareholders.242  If the shareholders do not like the message the corporation 
 
234 Id. at 911 (concluding that “[the BCRA] is both underinclusive and overinclusive”). 
235 Id. (“[T]he statute is overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including nonprofit 
corporations and for-profit corporations with only single shareholders.  As to other 
corporations, the remedy is not to restrict speech but to consider and explore other 
regulatory mechanisms.”). 
236 Id. at 905 (“The media exemption discloses further difficulties with the law now under 
consideration.  There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish 
between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those 
which are not.”). 
237 Id. at 911 (noting that if “a shareholder of a corporation that owns a newspaper disagrees 
with the political views the newspaper expresses,” then under the shareholder protection 
rationale, the government would also have “the authority to restrict the media 
corporation’s political speech”). 
238 Id. (“[I]f Congress had been seeking to protect dissenting shareholders, it would not have 
banned corporate speech in only certain media within 30 or 60 days before an 
election.”). 
239 Cf. id. (“A dissenting shareholder’s interests would be implicated by speech in any media 
at any time.”). 
240 Id. at 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660–61 
(1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913). 
241 Id. (“The concern to protect dissenting shareholders and union members has a long 
history in campaign finance reform.  It provided a central motivation for the Tillman Act 
in 1907 and subsequent legislation.”). 
242 Id. at 978 (addressing the majority’s claim that “abuses of shareholder money can be 
corrected ‘through the procedures of corporate democracy’” (quoting id. at 911) 
(majority opinion)). 
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endorses, they can vote for new management or can simply rely on the “Wall 
Street Rule” and sell their shares in that corporation.243  In addition, a 
shareholder could bring a lawsuit against any manager who puts his or her 
own interests above those of the corporation.244 
Interestingly, Justice Stevens retorted that the idea of a corporate 
democracy is a fragile one.245  Justice Stevens cited recent works of corporate 
scholarship to emphasize the reality of the modern investment 
marketplace.246  Most individuals own stock through intermediaries and 
seldom make individual trades.247  Moreover, it is extremely difficult for an 
individual to track and identify what corporate electioneering 
communications have been made by the corporations that such investor 
holds.248  Justice Stevens offered an assessment of the specific mechanisms of 
corporate democracy—voting for management and/or bringing suit against 
management.249  He cited to scholars Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, 
 
243 Id. (concluding that “by ‘corporate democracy,’ presumably the Court means the rights 
of shareholders to vote” and acknowledging that shareholders who are dissatisfied with 
the independent expenditures being made by a corporation “can divest”). 
244 Id. (examining the ability of shareholders “to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary 
duty,” which is a component of the majority’s invocation of “corporate democracy”).  For 
a discussion of how the interests of management and shareholders may significantly 
diverge in the area of political speech, and how management decisions in this area will 
likely be shielded from any shareholder input like other business decisions, see Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:  Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
83 (2010). 
245 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(pointing out that “many corporate lawyers will tell you that ‘these rights [supposedly 
included in the concept of corporate democracy] are so limited as to be almost 
nonexistent,’ given the internal authority wielded by boards and managers and the 
expansive protections afforded by the business judgment rule” (quoting Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 320 
(1999))). 
246 Id. (citing Blair & Stout, supra note 245, at 298–315, 320; Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for 
the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2009); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 165–66, 199–200 (1998)). 
247 See id. (“Studies show that a majority of individual investors make no trades at all during a 
given year.” (citing Evans, supra note 246, at 1117)); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing:  
The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 
845 (2009) (discussing the separation of beneficial ownership by investors and legal 
ownership of corporate shares by intermediaries, and arguing that those intermediaries 
typically vote with inside corporate managers and do not typically advocate for 
shareholder rights). 
248 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(pointing out that, “if the corporation in question operates a PAC, an investor who sees 
the company’s ads may not know whether they are being funded through the PAC or 
through the general treasury”). 
249 Id. (concluding that “[b]y ‘corporate democracy,’ presumably the Court means the rights 
of shareholders to vote and to bring derivtive suits for breach of fiduciary duty”). 
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indicating his agreement with them that in this area shareholder “rights are 
so limited as to be almost nonexistent.”250 
Other advocates have pointed out the weakness in the market 
mechanisms that the majority claimed can protect shareholders.251  Ann 
Yerger, the Executive Director of the Council of Institutional Investors, 
testified before a congressional subcommittee after the Citizens United 
decision was made.  In that testimony, she explained that the members of 
her council represent more than three trillion dollars in institutional market 
investments.252  Those investors represent pension and other employee 
benefit funds that by design have a long-term passive investment strategy to 
protect the pensions of their beneficiaries.253  Such investors simply are not 
likely to exercise the “Wall Street Rule” and sell their shares whenever they 
are dissatisfied.254  Ms. Yerger further stated in her testimony that the notion 
of corporate democracy in America is an embarrassment and boils down to 
little more than shareholders rubber-stamping management’s monopoly on 
power.255 
Corporate scholar John Coffee attacked the majority’s reasoning 
regarding shareholder protection in testimony before a congressional 
committee immediately after the Citizens United decision.  In that testimony, 
he commented that the majority assumed that shareholders have adequate 
recourse for unchecked political spending by corporations256 when in reality, 
“shareholders are actually very constrained in what they can do.”257 
 
250 Id. (quoting Blair & Stout, supra note 245, at 320) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
251 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Expressive Rights for Shareholders After Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 459 (2011) (discussing and dismissing the arguments that:  (i) corporate law is 
sufficient to protect shareholders; (ii) the Wall Street Rule works; and (iii) constitutional 
rights violations may not be claimed against corporations). 
252 Corporate Governance After Citizens United:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 10 (2010) (statement of Ann Yerger, Executive Director, 
Council of Institutional Investors) (“[T]he Council is a nonpartisan association of public, 
union, and corporate employee benefit plans with assets exceeding $3 trillion.”). 
253 Id. (explaining that the Council “is a nonpartisan association of public, union, and 
corporate employee benefit plans” who are “long-term patient investors due to their 
lengthy investment horizons and heavy commitment to passive investment strategies”). 
254 Corporate Governance After Citizens United:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 91 (2010) (testimony of Ann Yerger, Executive Director, 
Council of Institutional Investors) (“Because these passive strategies restrict Council 
members from exercising the ‘Wall Street walk’ and selling their shares when they are 
dissatisfied, corporate governance issues are of great interest to our members.”). 
255 Id. at 99 (“The current system of rubber stamp voting and management’s monopoly of 
the ballot are embarrassingly unworthy of our democracy.”). 
256 Corporate Governance After Citizens United:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 45 (2010) (testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle 
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Professor Laurence Tribe went as far as to say that “talk of shareholder 
democracy is largely illusory.”258 Further, he stated that the problem of 
allowing corporate managers to use shareholder assets to advance their own 
political agenda is “undeniable.”259  Finally, other scholars have expressed 
concerns that allowing corporate managers to make political contributions 
with corporate funds amounts to coercing shareholders to support political 
speech.260 
In sum, the Citizens United case represents a turning point in 
jurisprudence that is at the intersection of contract, corporate, and 
constitutional law.  The conservative majority of the Court contravened well-
accepted canons of judicial behavior to take on a facial challenge to a 
corporate regulation that was not raised by the parties themselves.261  To the 
dismay of the dissent, the majority went on to contravene precedent and 
elevate and act on rhetoric instead of a well-considered analysis of the 
circumstances surrounding the regulation.262  Furthermore, the analysis of 
the majority lacks any coherent conception of what a corporation is and how 
it functions in society.  Indeed, the majority seems to ignore prevailing 
corporate law scholarship that helps describe what a corporation is, what its 
role in society is, and when and how it might be regulated.  In the end, the 
 
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School) (“[B]oth the majority and Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion in Citizen United [sic] assume and state that shareholders have the 
power to curb and restrict the use of corporate funds for political or electioneering 
purposes.”). 
257 Id. 
258 Tribe, supra note 136 (“To be sure, the statutory and decisional laws of every state already 
create theoretical rights in individual shareholders to sue corporate boards under state 
law for making ‘wasteful’ expenditures, expenditures that do not advance the 
corporation’s interests, but talk of shareholder democracy is largely illusory in a world 
where there are countless obstacles to vigilant oversight of corporate management by the 
widely dispersed ‘owners’ of the underlying enterprise, especially when most of those 
owners have only the most attenuated link to their stock holdings, a link made all the 
more tenuous by the fact, noted in the Stevens dissent in Citizens United, that ‘[m]ost 
American households that own stock do so through intermediaries such as mutual funds 
and pension plans, . . . which makes it more difficult both to monitor and to alter 
particular holdings.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 978 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part))). 
259 Id. (“[I]n the context of for-profit, business corporations, that problem is undeniable.”). 
260 See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions:  A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and 
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 499 (2011) (arguing 
that “unrestricted corporate political speech poses a risk of compelled speech”). 
261 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Today’s decision is backwards in many senses.  It elevates the majority’s agenda over the 
litigants’ submissions, facial attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories 
over narrow statutory grounds, individual dissenting opinions over precedential holdings, 
assertion over tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality.”). 
262 Id. 
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majority achieved a result that portends a much more dominant role of 
corporations in the American economy as well as American politics. 
II. PART TWO:  THE CONTRACTARIAN ANALYSIS 
As has just been discussed, the Citizens United decision has empowered 
corporations with the constitutional rights of individuals, at least in the 
context of campaign finance.  The decision is decidedly de-regulatory in 
nature.  It has established new precedent that will make it more difficult for 
legislative bodies to regulate corporations in the future.  However, the 
majority’s decision established this new precedent while largely ignoring 
corporate law scholarship that presents a variety of theories through which 
the courts might more appropriately view a corporation and its role in 
society.263 
By contrast, Justice Stevens for the dissent seemed to discuss and adopt 
what has been known as the state entity theory of a corporation.264  This Part 
will more fully examine the state entity theory.  It will also highlight what is 
arguably the prevailing theory of a corporation:  the contractarian’s nexus of 
contracts theory.265  Both of these theoretical perspectives lead to a necessary 
conclusion that the majority decided Citizens United incorrectly. 
Part Two will provide support for future judicial and legislative bodies to 
resist the corporate de-regulatory movement represented so starkly by the 
Citizens United majority.  More generally, this Part will explain how the 
contractarian paradigm can provide a framework for courts and legislatures 
in the future to set and evaluate appropriate regulations on corporations. 
A.  The Corporation as a State Entity 
Justice Stevens referred specifically to the state entity theory of the firm 
in a footnote in his dissent.266  Ironically, there he explained that his analysis 
of the Citizens United case does not depend specifically on accepting one or 
 
263 For examples of that corporate law scholarship, see supra text accompanying note 9. 
264 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(distinguishing corporations from natural people and arguing that “[t]he conceit that 
corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not 
only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case”). 
265 Although this Part focuses on the state entity and contractarian theories, there are other 
theories of the corporation that have significant support.  One of those is the team 
production model, which discusses a corporation as a team of resources that work 
together to produce a profit.  The focus of that model is then how to divide the profits.  
See Blair & Stout, supra note 245. 
266 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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another of the prevailing theories of a corporation;267 however, his 
description of a corporation coincided directly with the state entity theory 
(also known as the artificial entity theory or the concession theory).268 
Justice Stevens characterized this theory as conceptualizing a corporation 
as “a grantee of a state concession.”269  Justice Stevens pointed out that the 
Austin case, discussed above, described the firm as a grantee of concessions 
from the state (and upheld the restrictions on corporate electioneering).270  
This state entity theory essentially posits that because corporations are 
created by the state (i.e. given a concession to exist and engage in certain 
activities), the state should have the right to regulate them.271 
The view of a corporation offered by proponents of the state entity 
theory matches the description of a corporation that Justice Stevens put 
forth in his dissent.272  Justice Stevens framed his description of the 
corporation with a historical perspective.273  As Justice Stevens detailed, only 
a few hundred corporations existed when the Constitution was written.274  
Unlike today, however, early incorporations were created by individual acts 
 
267 Id. (“Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a 
grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, a mediated 
hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized model.” (citations omitted)). 
268 He specifically cites to the state entity theory (also known as the artificial entity or the 
concession theory), the nexus of contracts theory, and the team production theory 
(which will not be discussed in this Article, as it has been overtaken by the nexus of 
contracts theory as the prevailing paradigm through which current corporate law scholars 
view and discuss the firm).  Id. (“Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the 
corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit and 
implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized model.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
269 Id. (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)). 
270 Id. (“Austin referred to the structure and the advantages of corporations as ‘state-
conferred’ in several places.” (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 660, 665, 667 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913)). 
271 See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm:  Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1989) (“Concession theory [also known as state 
entity theory] comes in degrees.  A strong version attributes the corporation’s very 
existence to state sponsorship.  A weaker version sets up state permission as a regulatory 
prerequisite to doing business.” (footnote omitted)); see also David Millon, Theories of the 
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206–11 (1990) (“The corporate entity was considered 
artificial, in the sense that the corporation owed its existence to the positive law of the 
state rather than to the private initiative of individual incorporators.”). 
272 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947–51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Corporations were created, supervised, and conceptualized as quasi-public entities, 
‘designed to serve a social function for the state.’” (quoting Oscar Handlin & Mary F. 
Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945))). 
273 Id. at 949–50 (“The Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be 
comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare.”). 
274 Id. at 949 n.53 (“Scholars have found that only a handful of business corporations were 
issued charters during the colonial period, and only a few hundred during all of the 18th 
century.”). 
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of the legislature.275  A corporation had to obtain legislative approval to exist 
and act in any way whatsoever.  This individualized method of state 
authorization to act betrays an early mistrust of corporations. 
Justice Stevens quotes a variety of early jurists and commentators in 
describing corporations as “soulless” and capable of encouraging “the worst 
urges of whole groups of men.”276  Early corporations would petition the 
state for a charter and would limit themselves to certain very specific 
activities in order to gain the approval of the state for their charter.277  Any 
activity that went beyond the stated purpose was considered ultra vires, or 
beyond that corporation’s power. 
States began to charter corporations because of the corporation’s unique 
ability to aggregate resources and accomplish tasks that might have been 
difficult or impossible otherwise.278  States grant the shareholders of 
corporations the privilege of limited liability, making corporations an 
extremely attractive vehicle for the aggregation and deployment of large 
amounts of invested resources.279  Shareholders risk only the amount of their 
investment, and any further debts of the corporation are discharged solely 
with corporate assets. 
Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah traces the state entity theory to the 
landmark Dartmouth College280 case, decided in 1819.281  In that case, Chief 
Justice Marshall considered what a corporate charter really signified.  Was it 
merely a contract with the state, or did it give the state the power to take 
 
275 See Millon, supra note 271, at 206 (describing “the practice of requiring a special act of 
the state legislature for each instance of incorporation”). 
276 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 949 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 194). 
277 Interestingly, early corporations in America often had a public function.  So, for example, 
early corporations involved activities like banking, insurance, and the building and 
maintaining of public utilities.  See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF 
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 17 (1970) 
(“From the 1780’s well into mid-nineteenth century the most frequent and conspicuous 
use of the business corporation . . . was for one particular type of enterprise, that which 
we later called public utility and put under particular regulation because of its special 
impact in the community.”). 
278 Id. at 20 (discussing the emergence of the corporate form, and explaining that only 
through the legal grant of the corporate charter were corporations then authorized to 
“use assets or exact payments or impose burdens on others in ways which would have 
been either impracticable or illegal or both without the law’s specific sanction”). 
279 Id. at 27–28 (discussing the value of the limitation on liability that the corporate form 
affords its shareholders). 
280 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (discussing the validity of 
corporate charters granted by the British government after the Revolutionary War). 
281 Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1005 (“These opinions represent the evolution of [Chief 
Justice Marshall’s] thinking on corporations, which moved from the aggregate view . . . to 
the artificial entity view, [articulated in] Dartmouth College . . . .”). 
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control of the corporation?282  Justice Marshall stated that a corporation “is 
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation 
of law.”283  While a state could not take over a corporation, Justice Marshall’s 
view of the corporation “left ample room for state regulation.”284 
Today, corporations do not need to seek specific legislative action to 
incorporate.  Instead, general incorporation statutes allow parties to form 
corporations, typically electronically, within hours, if not minutes.285  And 
corporate activities are not typically restricted as they used to be.  Most 
corporations are incorporated to pursue any legal purpose, dispensing with 
the notion that a corporation might be acting ultra vires.286 
Nonetheless, proponents of the state entity theory hold that, by enacting 
general incorporation statutes, states are allowing corporations to come into 
existence and act as legal persons.  Corporations are granted a fictional birth 
when they are incorporated and at that moment become a fictional legal 
person with certain rights and privileges.  Proponents of the state entity 
theory believe that the state should have the ability to limit the rights and 
privileges it grants to corporations if doing so would advance the interests of 
the political community within which the corporation operates.287 
The state entity or concession theory of a corporation has had varying 
degrees of prominence over the years.  Over the past thirty years, the neo-
classical economic view of a corporation as a nexus of contracts (the 
 
282 In that case, New Hampshire had attempted to take over Dartmouth by taking control 
over the appointment of the trustees of the college. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 518–25. 
283 Id. at 636. 
284 Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1007 (“[T]he emphasis on the artificial nature of the 
corporation left ample room for state regulation via the original charter.”).  Note that 
Professor Avi-Yonah goes on to argue his view that understanding a corporation as a real 
entity and not just an artificial entity is actually more fitting.  Id. at 1032 (concluding that 
one of the reasons for the prevalence of the real entity view is that it “fits reality much 
more” than either the artificial entity view or the aggregate view). 
285 For an example, see Florida’s Sunbiz website, which allows for electronic incorporation, 
and Delaware’s incorporation procedures, which allow for incorporation by fax of all of 
the relevant documents.  Electionic Filing & Certification, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF 
CORPS., https://efile.sunbiz.org/onlmenu.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012); How to Form a 
New Business Entity, DEL. DEP’T OF STATE:  DIV. OF CORPS., 
http://corp.delaware.gov/howtoform.shtml (last updated Nov. 14, 2012). 
286 For an example, see Delaware’s corporate law, which states that “[a] corporation may be 
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business 
or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this 
State.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 101(b). 
287 Cf. Avi-Yonah, supra note 9, at 1001 (describing the artificial entity theory’s understanding 
of a corporation as “a creature of the State”); see also Millon, supra note 271, at 211 
(“[T]he idea of the corporation as an artificial creature of the state provided the 
theoretical basis for a body of corporate law that explicitly addressed the relationship 
between corporate activity and public welfare.”). 
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contractarian paradigm) has taken center stage.288  However, the state entity 
theory still has traction, as indicated by the Citizens United dissent itself, in 
which Justice Stevens’s description of a corporation coincides with a view of 
the corporation as a grantee of state concessions. 
Most recently, Professor Sale has made a call for public corporations to 
be viewed in a new public way that focuses on those corporations as the 
product of a variety of forces exerted throughout society, including the 
media, the internet, and the state.289  Professor Sale does not couch her new 
call in the traditional theory of the firm as a state entity.  Nonetheless, she 
echoes that theory when she argues that public corporations are now, less 
than ever before, about private orderings with an increasing regulatory role 
being exerted by the state.290 
The implications of the state entity theory for the regulatory 
environment are clear.  Government regulation of corporations is 
appropriate and should be designed to optimize the role of corporations in 
society.  In accord with this theory, the BCRA would be seen as an entirely 
legitimate and permissible act by the government. 
The Citizens United case echoed Austin when it discussed a threefold 
purpose behind the type of campaign finance regulation at stake:  to 
(i) reduce corruption in politics; (ii) reduce distortion corporations might 
cause in the political process; and (iii) prevent use of shareholder assets to 
support political candidates whom the shareholders do not support 
personally.291  Any of those rationales would be sufficient justifications for 
the BCRA in the eyes of a proponent of the state entity theory. 
Indeed, Justice Stevens came to the same conclusion in his dissent:  that 
the BCRA was entirely constitutional.292  This state entity theory empowers 
the corporation only to the extent that the legislature sees appropriate.  It 
does not and would not easily allow a corporation to trump the interests of 
 
288 See Bainbridge, supra note 92, at 859 (arguing that the economic theory of the firm has 
taken over all serious corporate law scholarship and, in a particularly aggressive 
characterization of that predominance, proclaiming that the debate over whether the 
economic view should predominate is “over”). 
289 Sale, supra note 93, at 138 (positing that a “theory of the corporation that operates in a 
public sphere” and “a need for change in the way that officers and directors understand 
and do their jobs” are the necessary results of the fact that “the government and the 
media have increasing influence over public corporations and their governance”). 
290 Id. at 148 (arguing that, as a result of recent corporate scandals, more government 
regulation of corporations is likely). 
291 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010) (evaluating in turn 
the three considerations the FEC argued were compelling interests supporting the BCRA:  
“the antidistortion rationale on which Austin and its progeny rest in part,” “an 
anticorruption interest,” and “a shareholder-protection interest” (citing Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 674–75, 678 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring), 
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913)). 
292 Id. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the government that created it.  Instead, proponents of this theory empower 
the government with the right to regulate the corporation. 
B.  The Contractarian Paradigm 
The nexus of contracts theory of the corporation stands in contrast to 
the state entity theory.  This theory began to be discussed actively in the 
1980s.293  It has grown in popularity to become the leading economic 
perspective on the corporation and is now more generally the predominant 
theory of corporations discussed by corporate scholars.294 
1. The Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts 
Like the state entity theorists, so-called contractarians acknowledge that 
a corporation comes into being when a state grants that corporation its 
charter.  However, these theorists characterize the chartering act differently 
than the state entity proponents.  Contractarians give the act of chartering 
much less significance, viewing it simply as the state witnessing the 
emergence of an organization that involves a private ordering among a 
variety of constituents.  Indeed, contractarians view the corporation as a 
nexus or a hub of privately structured contractual arrangements among all 
of those constituents.295  The constituents of a corporation include the 
corporation’s shareholders, managers, customers, suppliers, employees, 
service providers, creditors, and even arguably the community within which 
the corporation is located.296 
This contractarian view of the firm is built on the fundamental notion, 
arguably embedded in the U.S. Constitution,297 that individuals should have 
 
293 The notion of a corporation being viewed as a nexus of contracts was introduced in 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (“The private corporation or 
firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting 
relationships . . . .”). 
294 See Bainbridge, supra note 91, at 859. 
295 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 293, at 311 (“The private corporation or firm is simply one 
form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships . . . .”). 
296 Id. at 310 (“Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but 
with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc..”). 
297 There is a long history of finding the liberty of contract within the U.S. Constitution.  
Most notably, there is the provision in Article I, § 10 stating that no State “shall . . . pass 
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  Moreover, 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty provision has been interpreted by a long line of 
cases as providing for economic liberty.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no 
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).  
The most infamous case to divine a liberty of contract right from this provision was 
Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to make a contract in 
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the liberty of contract to structure their own arrangements without the 
undue interference of the government.298  This notion, of course, is where 
the contractarians diverge from the state entity theorists.  While the state 
entity proponents argue that whatever the state creates it can regulate, the 
contractarians argue that the state’s role should be limited to enforcing and 
policing the privately structured contracts that create and sustain the 
corporation.299 
So, for example, an employee of a corporation strikes a bargain—i.e. 
enters a contract—with the corporation when both parties agree to certain 
terms of employment.  Creditors likewise enter into certain agreements with 
a corporation to provide financing in accord with certain contractual terms.  
And shareholders should understand that they are getting a bundle of rights 
with respect to that corporation in exchange for the money they invest.300 
Contractarians would argue that all of these parties should strike the 
bargain they find acceptable and live within the terms of that bargain, or 
else they will find themselves in breach and possibly subject to legal recourse 
from their counterparties.  Again, the traditional contractarian argument is 
that there is no compelling need for government regulation or oversight 
beyond the policing and enforcement of the contractual bargains.301 
2. Constitutional Support for Liberty of Contract 
This liberty of contract idea finds its source in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution.  Both provisions discuss the primacy of an 
 
relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”). 
298 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 15, 22–23 (1991) (asserting that justifications for intervention by the 
state are not applicable to “intra-corporate affairs”); Roberta Romano, Answering the 
Wrong Question:  The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599 
(1989) (discussing the permissive nature of corporate law, which allows parties to 
structure their own contracts freely). 
299 Bainbridge, supra note 91, at 860 (“Contractarians contend that corporate law is generally 
comprised of default rules, from which shareholders are free to depart, rather than 
mandatory rules.”). 
300 This notion of limited government regulation of corporations underscores the fact that 
many corporate laws are default laws, which allow parties to opt out of their application.  
See, e.g., Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws:  Opting Out of Securities 
Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 526–27 (1999) (describing 
statutes adopted by some jurisdictions that allow shareholders to contract out of common 
law constraints and adopt different fiduciary standards). 
301 For more discussion of this notion that corporate regulation should be at a minimum, see 
Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?:  A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. 
REV. 542 (1990). 
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individual’s liberty, stating that the government shall not “deprive” an 
individual of “liberty . . . without due process of law.”302 
Dating back to the late 1800s, federal case law interpreted those clauses 
to indicate that all individuals must have the liberty to structure their lives 
and their business dealings as they deem proper, and to enter into contracts 
to effectuate those arrangements.  The earliest federal case to discuss this 
liberty of contract notion was Allgeyer v. Louisiana.303  In that case, Justice 
Peckham made the now-famous statement that: 
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth Amendment] means not only 
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his 
person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right 
of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to 
use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his 
livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, 
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, 
necessary, and essential to carrying out . . . [those] purposes . . . .304 
The most notorious case for enshrining this notion of a liberty of 
contract is Lochner v. New York, decided in the early 1900s.305  In that case, a 
state statute that regulated the working hours for bakers was challenged as 
violating the liberty of contract interest enshrined by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.306  The Supreme Court found that the liberty interest was 
paramount and struck down the statute for impinging on the individuals’ 
rights to structure their working arrangements as they saw fit.307 
The Lochner case was later demonized as a perfect example of judicial 
activism, with the Justices enforcing their own libertarian preferences for a 
laissez-faire economy, contrary to the policies that certain legislatives bodies 
were enacting.308  Cases decided just a few decades after Lochner would 
 
302 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
303 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down as unconstitutional a Louisiana regulation that made 
it criminal to enter into an insurance contract with an out-of-state insurer that did not 
comply with Louisiana law). 
304 Id. at 589. 
305 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
306 Id. at 53. 
307 Id. at 57 (“The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be 
dismissed in a few words.  There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty 
of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the 
occupation of a baker.”). 
308 Justice Holmes wrote the dissent and described the majority opinion as promoting a 
laissez-faire political and economic agenda.  Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“This case 
is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not 
entertain.”).  Other scholars have seized on that dissent to decry the opinion as judicial 
activism at its worst.  See, e.g., David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”:  
Liberty of Contract During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 218–19 (2009) 
(referring to the decision as an “egregious instance of judicial activism” and explaining 
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question what this liberty of contract was and where was it found in the 
Constitution.309  Moreover, faced with the Great Depression and pressure 
from the executive branch, the judiciary in the 1930s and 1940s routinely 
upheld statutes regulating the workplace310 in contravention of the 
precedent set by the Lochner case. 
Despite the Lochnerian tradition falling out of favor, corporate 
contractarians today still espouse the notion that the constituents of a 
corporation should be given the liberty of contract to structure their 
business as they see fit, without undue government interference.  However, 
as I have argued elsewhere, the logical application of the Lochnerian liberty 
of contract is not a libertarian utopia free of government regulation.311  On 
the contrary, if the government has sufficient reason for asserting a 
regulation, then the liberty of contract can be limited.  Therefore, a 
contractarian view of the corporation is compatible with and supportive of 
government regulation, where the regulation has sufficient justification.312 
As the Lochner case itself explained, the liberty of contract found in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution is not without 
limits.313  If government regulation is “fair, reasonable, and appropriate” 
then the regulation should withstand constitutional scrutiny.314  So, for 
example, in Lochner, the Supreme Court examined whether there was an 
important reason for regulating the working hours of bakers.315  The 
 
that constitutional law casebooks, legal history textbooks, commentaries written by 
conservatives and liberals, and opinions by Supreme Court justices all share this view). 
309 For example, the Court asked in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, “What is this freedom?  
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.  It speaks of liberty . . . .” 300 
U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
310 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a statute 
prohibiting the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce). 
311 See Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Regulation, 11 TRANSACTIONS:  
TENN. J. BUS. L. 135, 136 (2009) (disagreeing with the contractarian view that “because 
corporations involve nothing more than private contractual orderings among various 
parties, there should be little or no meaningful regulation to impinge on those parties’ 
liberty to contract as they see fit”). 
312 For a slightly different application of this idea, see Benjamin Means, A Contractual 
Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2010) (arguing 
that regulation of corporations is compatible with a contractarian approach to 
corporations because the state is thereby enforcing “implicit contractual obligations of 
good faith and fair dealing”). 
313 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at  53–56 (explaining that the state has the power to prevent 
individuals from making certain kinds of contracts, but that there is also a limit to the 
exercise of the police power by the state). 
314 Id. at 56. 
315 Id. at 58–64. 
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majority of that Court found none and thus the Court struck down the 
regulation.316 
The dissent, however, argued vociferously that there was ample evidence 
of harsh working conditions in the baking industry and that bakers were 
being subjected to unhealthy conditions:  “Nearly all bakers are pale-faced 
and of more delicate health than the workers of other crafts, which is chiefly 
due to their hard work and their irregular and unnatural mode of living.”317  
The standard the Lochner majority set up for finding a regulation 
constitutional could have easily been met had the majority agreed with the 
dissent’s reasoning. 
3. Modern Contract Law Jurisprudence Justifies Regulation 
The liberty of contract notion is premised on the assumption that parties 
freely enter into bargains and that the resulting contracts should be upheld 
and not subject to interference or regulation by the government.  As is fairly 
easy to imagine in the Lochnerian example of harsh working conditions for 
bakers in the early 1900s, it is frequently the case that parties do not have 
equal bargaining power and that resulting bargains are not freely struck.318 
Modern principles of contract law acknowledge the potential for defects 
in the contracting process and for resulting inequitable bargains.  Among 
the doctrinal defenses to the enforcement of a contract are:  incapacity, 
mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, unconscionability, and lack of 
good faith and fair dealing.319  Often, entire categories of contracts (like 
employment agreements with bakers in the early 1900s) are plagued by any 
of the above-named defenses.  Since the assumption that parties freely and 
fairly enter into contracts is therefore often not true, the maxim that 
government regulation should be limited becomes fallacious. 
If a contract is challenged in court after it has been made (i.e. ex post), 
the successful application of any of those contract law defenses just 
mentioned may lead to the contract being unenforceable.  It is therefore my 
argument that if the government can show that there is a likelihood for a 
category of contracts to be infected by some such defect, then government 
 
316 Id. at 64 (“It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as provided for in 
this section of the statute under which the indictment was found, and the plaintiff in 
error convicted, has no such direct relation to, and no such substantial effect upon the 
health of the employé, as to justify us in regarding the section as really a health law. . . .  
Under such circumstances the freedom of master and employé to contract with each 
other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or 
interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution.”). 
317 Id. at 70. 
318 For a more thorough discussion of this point, see Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner, 
Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609, 654–55 (2011). 
319 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 12, 151–58, 159–73, 174–77, 205, 208 (1981). 
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can justify regulation in that area in advance (i.e. ex ante).  Not only is such 
regulation justifiable, it is also prudent and should be encouraged. 
4. The Contractarian Paradigm as an Assessment Tool 
As has just been discussed, the contractarian paradigm can be used to 
assess whether and when corporate regulation is appropriate.  When 
applying the contractarian paradigm, a distinction needs to be drawn 
between whether a proposed regulation is constitutional and whether the 
proposed regulation is prudent. 
The constitutional hurdle is perhaps the easier of the two to meet, but 
may be more difficult to understand conceptually.  Any regulation must first 
be justified constitutionally as a legitimate exercise of legislative power, and 
second must not offend any other provision of the Constitution.  As the 
Commerce Clause will provide the most likely justification for a federal 
corporate regulation, so the first prong of the constitutional analysis likely 
will not prove controversial.320 
However, even if the federal government has the authority to enact a 
statute, it is constitutionally forbidden from violating any other provision of 
the Constitution.321  Under the contractarian paradigm, the constitutional 
interest at stake is not the corporation’s free speech right, as the majority in 
Citizens United decided, but the corporate constituents’ liberty of contract to 
enter into any bargain deemed appropriate.  Constitutionally, the 
government should be allowed to intrude on that liberty interest only if 
there is a sufficient reason.  The liberty of contract cases from the Lochner 
era used broad language that suggest a regulation is constitutional when it is 
“fair, reasonable, and appropriate.”322 
Under today’s jurisprudential tests applied to the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ Due Process Clauses, the Court uses three levels of scrutiny to 
assess whether those clauses of the Constitution are offended:  rational basis, 
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.323  Where a Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment right is not deemed fundamental, rational basis review is used 
 
320 For a general discussion of the current state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the 
United States, see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005) (holding that “Congress’ 
Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use 
of marijuana in compliance with California law”). 
321 For a general discussion of this idea, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding 
that a statutory scheme adopted by Virginia to prevent marriages between persons on the 
basis of race was inconsistent with and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
322 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56. 
323 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (describing the three tests 
available to evaluate an Equal Protection claim); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 216 (1944) (employing strict scrutiny). 
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and regulations prevail if they are adopted for some rational purpose.324  If 
courts apply the three levels of scrutiny to the liberty of contract interest, 
that interest will likely receive only rational basis review.325 
Using this contractarian paradigm, then, regulations that intrude on the 
liberty of contract of the parties involved will pass the rational basis review 
and be deemed constitutional when there is any rational purpose for the 
statute.  Correcting for systematic defects in the contracts being regulated 
would surely qualify as a rational purpose.  Thus, regulations adopted after 
application of the contractarian paradigm are likely to be constitutional 
(assuming they are not discriminatory and do not otherwise offend the 
Constitution). 
The second question is whether a particular regulation is prudent under 
the contractarian paradigm.  Those prudential decisions are not fraught 
with the jurisprudential complexity of a constitutional analysis, but are likely 
to be complex policy questions.  Those questions should be left for 
legislators to answer.326  The contractarian paradigm can help legislators 
craft appropriate policies. 
In assessing the appropriateness of any regulation, the starting point for 
the contractarian is a liberty of contract position.  That position begins with 
an assumption that the parties to transactions relating to the corporation 
(those in the nexus of contracts) should be free of regulation.  This means 
that the liberty of contract enjoyed by the parties to the transaction should 
be honored and preserved to allow those parties to achieve the results they 
deem appropriate.  In economic terms, it allows parties to maximize their 
own value or utility from each transaction. 
However, it is my argument that even for the contractarian, that 
presumption in favor of the autonomy of the parties and against 
government regulation must shift when the contracts involved are subject to 
 
324 The jurisprudential framework for analyzing constitutional rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments dates back to United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 
(1938), which argued that the judiciary should generally defer to the legislative branch 
unless there is a fundamental right involved or invidious discrimination against a group 
needing judicial protection. 
325 However, for example, a contract relating to child custody may implicate a fundamental 
right that triggers a heightened level of scrutiny for government regulation. 
326 See Jeffery Rosen, The Supreme Court:  Judicial Temperament and the Democratic Ideal, 47 
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (holding up Chief Justice John Marshall as a model of judicial 
restraint, and comparing him in this regard to current Chief Justice John Roberts).  
Roberts himself has repeatedly used the metaphor that judges are meant to act as umpire 
and only call the balls and the strikes.  See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee, C.J. of the 
U.S. Supreme Court) (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not 
to pitch or bat.”). 
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an applicable jurisprudential defense against enforceability.  In other words, 
the presumption would shift when the enforceability of those contracts 
could be successfully challenged with contract law jurisprudence through ex 
post litigation, i.e. litigation that occurs after the contract has been struck.  
This is where contract law jurisprudence is instructive.  Any contracts that as 
a class would trigger any of the defenses to contract enforcement ex post are 
thereby defective ex ante.  It follows that those contracts are in need of 
regulation to redress those deficiencies.  Included among those defenses are 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, unconscionability, and lack of good faith 
and fair dealing.327 
Courts can and should intervene to opine on the constitutionality of a 
regulation.  However, beyond the constitutional decision, it is for the 
legislature to craft and adopt regulations that might best redress the 
contracting flaws involved in any category of transaction being regulated.  
For those determinations, the elected legislative body is best suited to find 
the most prudent regulatory solutions. 
C.  A Contractarian View of Citizens United 
In accord with the nexus of contracts paradigm, the Citizens United case 
likely would have had the opposite outcome, finding the electioneering 
regulation both constitutional and appropriate.  As discussed by both the 
majority and the dissent in Citizens United, one argument put forth to uphold 
the electioneering regulation was the shareholder protection rationale.328  In 
the contractarian framework, this argument is stronger as an argument to 
support and enforce the bargain, or the contract, that the shareholders 
strike with a corporation when the shareholder makes a decision to buy 
stock in that company. 
This contract or bargain is often not a contract with the corporation in 
the legal sense, since many shareholders buy stock in the securities markets, 
long after the company itself has sold the stock.  In most cases, the company 
is not technically a party to the bargain.  As was discussed, critics of the 
nexus of contracts model would point to this fact to argue that the 
contractarian paradigm does not apply at all in these cases.329 
 
327 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 12, 151–58, 159–73, 174–77, 205, 208 (1981). 
328 Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (majority 
opinion) with id. at 977–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
329 See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of 
“Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1134 (2011) (reviewing LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010)) (discussing the notion that the 
nexus of contracts theory is meant to be an instructive metaphor, but lampooning it for 
use that is sometimes seemingly meant to be a description of reality, and sometimes a 
metaphor).  In their article, Hayden and Bodie critique a book by Professor Larry 
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That criticism misses the point.  The paradigm is instructive because it 
helps assess what the constituents of a corporation expect to get from their 
connection with the corporation.  Putting aside the legal realist argument 
that there is often not a specific bargain with the corporation, the paradigm 
still allows analysts to assess whether government regulation might be 
warranted, or even constitutional. 
Even if the Citizens United majority was correct to address the facial 
constitutionality of the BCRA, it was wrong to conclude that it was 
unconstitutional.  As mentioned above, because the contractarian paradigm 
treats corporations as nothing more than a nexus of contracts among its 
constituents, it is a mistake to conclude that a corporation should be given 
the First Amendment protection given to individuals. 
Instead, the constitutional analysis would have focused on, first, whether 
Congress had the constitutional authority to pass the statute, and, second, 
whether the statute offended any other provision of the Constitution.  With 
respect to the first question, Congress surely had the power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate corporations doing business in interstate 
commerce.  With respect to the second question, the Court might have 
questioned whether the regulation unconstitutionally impinged on 
shareholders’ liberty of contract interest to invest in corporations without 
government interference or regulation.  Because that interest is likely to get 
only rational basis review, any rational basis for the statute would allow it to 
pass constitutional muster.  Specifically, protecting shareholders from 
managers using corporate funds to promote their own political agenda 
would be a sufficient rational basis for the BCRA.  Moreover, the BCRA also 
was designed to decrease corruption in the political process.  Again, that is 
more than sufficient to form a rational basis for the regulation. 
In addition to aiding courts in assessing the constitutionality of corporate 
regulations, the contractarian paradigm can also be useful to legislators.  
Using the BCRA as an illustration, legislators might have begun their 
analysis with a starting point that allows investors freedom to contract with a 
corporation with no government interference or regulation.  However, the 
presumption in favor of liberty of contract and the absence of regulation 
would shift in this case after observing that corporate electioneering is not 
likely to be a part of the implied bargain shareholders believe they are 
striking when they invest in a corporation.  Indeed, allowing corporate 
electioneering might result in implying a bargain between shareholders and 
the corporation that could be deemed unconscionable. 
 
Ribstein that argues that, in contrast to other business entities, the corporation is actually 
a very inflexible creature of the regulatory world and not at all merely a creature of 
contract.  Id. at 1128–29.  In light of this argument, they attempt to pronounce the nexus 
of contract theory dead, or at least gasping for its last breath.  Id. at 1134. 
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The doctrine of unconscionability requires that the process of the 
bargain be flawed in some way and that the results themselves involve some 
sense of gross unfairness.330  Here, the bargaining process involving the sale 
of stock could be said to be flawed by something approaching fraud.  An 
investor in a company typically views that investment as a bargain that the 
target company will attempt to maximize profits, while balancing the 
interests of its constituents.  Unbridled participation in politics by the 
corporation has never been a part of that bargain.  Thus, the investor might 
be lured into the investment, hoping for profits, while unwittingly 
supporting political candidates that are unacceptable to that investor.  That 
result could surely be said to be grossly unfair, satisfying the second 
requirement for a contract to be unconscionable.  Because stock purchases 
across the board could be said to involve this element of unconscionability, a 
contractarian analysis would conclude that regulation in this area is not only 
constitutional, but that it is also appropriate.  Of course, the exact design of 
the regulation is left to Congress. 
The conclusion that investors do not imagine corporate involvement in 
politics in their bargain could seem controversial to some.  Indeed, the 
argument could be made that the shareholder bargain does involve giving 
unbridled discretion to corporate management to do whatever it deems to 
be in the best interests of the corporation. 
However, that argument goes too far.  In part, the response to that 
argument involves some deference to history and tradition.  As both the 
majority and the dissent in the Citizens United case acknowledge, corporate 
involvement in politics has been regulated for more than one hundred 
years.331  Further, dating back earlier than that, corporations were specifically 
and individually chartered by the state to engage in certain limited and 
authorized activities.332  That history forms the backdrop for investors’ 
perspectives on the bargain struck when purchasing stock in a corporation.  
Investors expect there to be limits on what a corporation can do, and 
specifically limits in the area of political spending. 
Another retort might be that a new unregulated era is now at hand, and 
investors now will know that corporate electioneering is unregulated.  
Investors can choose to sell their stock if they are not comfortable with that 
situation.  Or investors can choose not to invest in the first place, 
understanding that corporations are now allowed to use treasury funds to 
support or oppose political candidates. 
 
330 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
331 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 925–28 (Scalia, J., concurring) with id. at 948–51 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
332 See supra text accompanying note 78. 
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But even if the expectation of limited corporate involvement in politics 
did not exist, an unregulated ability for corporations to finance political 
campaigns runs against the shareholders’ interests because it diverts funds 
from profitmaking into politics.333  The primary reason shareholders invest 
in stock is profit.  In fact, recent studies have concluded that corporations 
have not been able to show a positive correlation between support for 
political candidates and profitability.334 
Moreover, the temptation for corporate managers to support the 
candidates of their choosing and disguise that personal support as support 
that is in the best interests of the corporation runs contrary to the 
fundamental bargain of the shareholder.  Conflict of interest transactions 
are prohibited under every state’s corporate law.335  However, policing those 
conflicted transactions in the area of electioneering would be almost 
impossible.  All management needs to do to justify electioneering is simply 
argue that the political support was in the best interest of the company.  
Given the complexity and variety of positions taken by any given politician, it 
would be almost impossible to overcome management’s claim in support of 
any such transactions.  Thus, again, a contractarian would argue that 
limiting those conflict of interest transactions ex ante simply supports and 
ensures the sanctity of the bargain the shareholders expect in the first place. 
In this Part, I have discussed and described the leading theories that 
help scholars and policymakers understand corporations and their role in 
society.  The state entity theory seems to have been described by the dissent 
 
333 See Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion:  Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2011) (arguing that as a result of Citizens United, 
corporations will be coerced into donating more and more money to politics, and that 
since many corporations will be similarly coerced, any profitability of the donations will 
not increase with the increased donations, and that the results instead may be a harmful 
inefficient allocation of resources). 
334 See, e.g., CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING:  GIVING 
SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE 9 (2010), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net
/ 54a676e481f019bfb8_bvm6ivakn.pdf (“[D]espite corporate managers’ attempts to 
influence public policy through spending on elections, corporate political spending 
correlates with lower shareholder value.” (citing Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke & 
Tracy Wang, Corporate Political Contributions:  Investment or Agency? (Apr. 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670))); see also John C. Coates, 
IV, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity:  What Effect Will Citizens United 
Have on Shareholder Wealth?, HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 684, at 
16 (Sept. 21, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680861## (discussing the negative 
relationship between strong corporate governance and political spending, concluding 
that firms that are more engaged in political activity result in lower profitability for 
shareholders). 
335 See, e.g., Delaware General Corporations Law §§ 122(17), 144 (2008); Model Business 
Corporations Act §§ 8.30, 8.70 (2011). 
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in Citizens United, leading to its position that the electioneering restriction at 
issue was indeed constitutional.  Arguably, the prevailing paradigm for 
understanding a corporation is the economic or contractarian nexus of 
contracts paradigm.  As Part Two has shown, that paradigm focuses on the 
bargains being struck between the constituents of a corporation in order to 
assess whether regulation is constitutional and appropriate.  Part Two has 
attempted to outline more generally how the contractarian paradigm can 
guide decisionmakers in assessing regulations. 
The majority of the Court in Citizens United ignores this prevailing 
contractarian theory as well as the state entity theory.336  In doing so, the 
majority arrives at the dangerous conclusion that corporations are entitled 
to the same First Amendment protection in the area of campaign finance as 
individuals.  Had the majority considered the contractarian paradigm, it 
would surely have arrived at a different conclusion. 
III. PART THREE:  A CONTRACTARIAN ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO 
CITIZENS UNITED 
As we have seen in Parts One and Two, the majority in Citizens United 
disregarded prevailing corporate law scholarship to overturn precedent and 
find that corporations should have the same First Amendment free speech 
rights as individuals, at least in the context of federal electioneering 
regulations.  The contractarian paradigm is arguably the prevailing 
paradigm used by scholars to understand corporate behavior and assess 
corporate regulation.  It is my argument that this contractarian paradigm 
can and should be used to effectively assess when regulations are 
constitutional and prudent. 
This Part will use the contractarian paradigm discussed and developed in 
Part Two to assess proposed responses to the Citizens United case.  The most 
dramatic response has been Senator Tom Udall’s call for a constitutional 
amendment to effectively overturn Citizens United.337  A constitutional 
amendment, duly enacted, would be beyond reproach from the courts. 
Aside from that dramatic proposal, however, there have been two other 
significant proposals to attempt to redress the Citizens United case.  Both of 
these proposals involve regulatory responses.  The first involves mandating 
disclosure of all electioneering expenditures.  The second demands specific 
shareholder approval for any electioneering expenditures made by a 
 
336 See Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation, supra note 8, at 224; supra text accompanying 
note 9 (describing examples of corporate theoretical scholarship, such as were 
disregarded by the Citizens United majority). 
337 See supra text accompanying note 34. 
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corporation.  Both of these responses will be discussed and assessed here in 
accord with the contractarian paradigm described in Part Two. 
A.  Disclosure 
In the aftermath of the Citizens United decision, many scholars and 
commentators have advocated for a Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) regulation that would require corporations to disclose their political 
contributions, with some exception for de minimis amounts.  A group of ten 
law professors who specialize in corporate law have petitioned the SEC to 
effect just such a regulation (“SEC Disclosure Petition”).338  In their 
Disclosure Petition, those professors argue that there is a growing investor 
appetite to know the details of corporate political spending, and that, 
perhaps most importantly, such disclosure is necessary to ensure corporate 
accountability.339 
In a follow-up letter to the SEC written in December 2011, the Brennan 
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law wrote to support the 
Disclosure Petition submitted by the law professors.340  The Brennan Center 
is a leading non-profit institute for policy analysis and focuses much of its 
work on election law.  “[T]he Brennan Center urges the Commission to use 
its authority to bring transparency and accountability to corporate political 
spending.”341 
Other scholars embrace the idea of more disclosure as an appropriate 
legislative response to Citizens United.342  Almost immediately following the 
decision, Professor Tribe called for more disclosure of specifics regarding 
who is funding particular electioneering communications.343  Professor Tribe 
described such regulations as clearly within Congress’ power to regulate 
interstate commerce.344 
 
338 Petition for Rulemaking from The Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political 
Spending to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf 
[hereinafter “SEC Disclosure Petition”]. 
339 Id. at 2, 7–9. 
340 Letter from J. Adam Skaggs, Senior Counsel to the Brennan Center for Justice, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-20.pdf. 
341 Id. at 1. 
342 See, e.g., John Coates & Taylor Lincoln, Fulfilling Kennedy’s Promise:  Why the SEC Should 
Mandate Disclosure of Corporate Political Activity, PUBLIC CITIZEN 10–11 (Sept. 2011) 
(arguing that corporations that voluntarily make political disclosures actually showed 
statistically higher market valuations). 
343 Tribe, supra note 136. 
344 Id. 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court itself in the Citizens United case opined 
that disclosure requirements regarding corporate political contributions 
would likely be constitutional: 
[P]rompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and 
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected 
officials accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can 
determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the 
corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether 
elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.345 
Eight of the nine Justices on the Supreme Court concurred on this part 
of the Citizens United opinion.346  Despite the strong support for this 
disclosure regulation and even likely Supreme Court approval, the SEC has 
not taken action to put a disclosure requirement into the rulemaking 
pipeline.347 
From the contractarian paradigm, such a disclosure requirement is both 
constitutional and prudent.  Again, one of the benefits of using the 
contractual analysis of a corporation is the insight gained from analyzing the 
bargaining dynamics that exist between the corporation and its 
constituents.348  Recommendations for appropriate regulation flow from that 
analysis. 
From a constitutional point of view, such a regulation would be within 
the commerce power of Congress (here as delegated to the SEC).  Further, 
the injury to the right to liberty of contract of the parties would be overcome 
by the rational basis for enacting the regulation, i.e. ensuring that investors 
better understand what their corporate managers are doing with corporate 
profits. 
From a prudential point of view, the starting point for policymakers 
again would be contractarian deference to the liberty of the parties to freely 
contract for whatever they intend.  Only where the bargain would be 
infected by some defect would that deference shift in favor of regulation.  
Where the regulation seeks to overcome some categorical infirmity in the 
contracts under consideration, the regulation would be deemed prudent. 
If corporate electioneering is allowed to proceed with no disclosure 
requirement, then shareholders cannot adequately evaluate their bargain—
i.e. their decision to invest or to continue holding stock in any particular 
 
345 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (internal citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
346 Id. at 886. 
347 The SEC acknowledges receipt of the petition, and compared to other Petitions for 
Rulemaking, there has been an extraordinary amount of additional comments received 
in response.  See, e.g., Comments on Rulemaking Petition, SEC, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/ comments/4-637/4-637.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2013). 
348 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 91, at 864–69. 
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company.  Indeed, a majority of the largest public companies in the United 
States have actually begun to disclose their electioneering voluntarily.349  
Some critics of disclosure requirements argue that the marketplace will 
achieve the optimal amount of disclosure that shareholders need and want 
and that will not be overly burdensome or costly for corporations.350 
However, a requirement that corporations disclose their electioneering 
would help shareholders of every public company understand the nature of 
their investment decision.  Disclosure generally aids parties in making a 
bargain that is more fair, or might lead parties to avoid the bargain 
altogether. 
In this more specific example involving disclosure of political 
contributions, the same logic applies.  More disclosure should lead to a 
fairer bargain.  Conversely, the ability of a corporation to hide its political 
contributions leads to a potentially unfair bargain with investors.  Investors 
could become unwitting contributors to candidates they do not support. 
B.  Shareholder Approval 
Another possible regulatory response to the Citizens United decision is to 
require specific shareholder approval of corporate electioneering 
expenditures before they happen.351  This approach was actually put into 
place in England in 2000 as an amendment to the British Companies Act.352  
The amendment was enacted in response to the perception that corporate 
money was being used to buy influence.  The amendment was an attempt to 
create more transparency and accountability at the corporate level.353 
The exact details of such a plan are beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, as an example, corporations could be required to get shareholder 
approval to spend up to a certain fixed amount on political donations 
 
349 See, e.g., TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 334, at 21 (“At the very least, Congress should 
require corporations to disclose their political spending, as many top firms have already 
volunteered to do.”). 
350 See Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear:  A Free Market Approach for Economic Expression, 17 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 24–29 (2012) (arguing that in order “[t]o properly function, public 
discussion must exist in an open, self-regulating marketplace”). 
351 For an excellent overview of this suggestion, see TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 334, at 16–
20 (analyzing a British law that has implemented shareholder approval requirements). 
352 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, at c. 41, § 50 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contents; see also Bebchuk & Jackson, 
supra note 244, at 98–99 (discussing the British law requiring shareholder consent for 
political spending in excess of £5000). 
353 See TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 334, at 16 (discussing the problem of corporate money 
in politics in the United Kingdom before the enactment of the shareholder approval 
amendment, and quoting Lord Neill, who chaired the Committee on Standards in Public 
Life as saying the reform was needed “to bring the United Kingdom into line with best 
practice in other mature democracies”). 
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generally.  Alternatively, corporations might be required to get approval for 
each specific donation, specifying amount and recipient.  Regardless of how 
such a proposal is crafted in the United States, the basic idea of requiring 
shareholder approval for corporate political donations can also be evaluated 
in accord with the contractarian nexus of contracts paradigm. 
Once again, the constitutional analysis is fairly simple to satisfy.  
Congress or the SEC would surely have power to enact such a regulation on 
the basis of the Commerce Clause.  Moreover, any rational basis for the 
statute will satisfy any issues with interference in any liberty of contract 
interest.  Here, the rational basis for the regulation—investor protection—is 
surely sufficient to uphold the regulation against a constitutional challenge. 
The prudential analysis of the policy is more difficult but is aided by 
using the contractarian paradigm.  The starting point for the contractarian 
is a default position that would defer to the liberty of contract of the parties 
and would prefer that no regulation interfere with that liberty of contract.  
But again, if there is some defect in the set of bargains under consideration, 
then the default position would shift and would support regulation that is 
appropriately tailored to address the defect. 
When considering this proposal for shareholder approval of political 
contributions, the defect present in the class of contracts under 
consideration is the same defect discussed above in connection with the 
disclosure proposal.  If corporations are allowed to electioneer in an 
unregulated and undisclosed way, then the resulting bargain with the 
shareholder can be viewed as defective.  It might involve unconscionability, 
on the basis of the unfairness present.  It might involve a lack of good faith 
on that same basis.  It might involve misrepresentation on the basis that the 
shareholder would not and should not expect any profits to be routed into 
politics without shareholder consent. 
Shareholders make their investment bargain in order to maximize 
profits, not to support or oppose candidates for office.  Unregulated and 
unbridled electioneering spending of corporate funds has no illustrated 
positive correlation with profitability.354  Further, corporate support for any 
particular candidate is likely to run counter to the political preferences of 
many shareholders.  Without the ability to approve political spending (or 
even to know the extent of it) shareholders enter into a bargain with 
unforeseen consequences, consequences that may indeed be opposed to the 
general reason the bargain was made in the first place:  maximizing profits. 
In his testimony before a congressional subcommittee immediately after 
Citizens United was decided, Professor John Coffee spoke to the notion that 
corporate political spending is often said to be in the best interest of 
 
354 See supra text accompanying note 309. 
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shareholders.  To the contrary, he states that “the interests of shareholders 
and managers do not appear to be well aligned with respect to political 
contributions.”355  Coffee cites to the Center for Political Accountability, 
which he explains has found that corporations often fund “political causes 
or issues having no obvious relationship to their corporation’s interests.”356 
The shareholder approval proposal goes directly to solving this 
contracting problem.  In this case, the proposal corrects the defects present 
in allowing unchecked spending by ensuring shareholder approval of the 
political support. 
One complication of this scheme comes from a legal realist perspective.  
Critics of corporate democracy often claim that shareholders, especially 
individual shareholders, are rationally detached from participation in any 
aspects of corporate governance.357  Most individual shareholders throw away 
their proxy materials and never cast their vote even when it comes to 
electing a board of directors.358  Moreover, for many shareholders, 
ownership in a corporation is indirect.  Their shares are held in a mutual 
fund or some other investment vehicle and managed by institutional 
managers.359 
If individual shareholders opt out of voting to approve or disapprove 
political spending, then they do so implicitly accepting either outcome.  It is 
less likely that institutional managers will opt out of approving or 
disapproving political spending.  Instead, such institutional shareholders will 
be incentivized by their own desire for profits to push corporate managers to 
show that the political spending contemplated will help the corporation 
improve profitability.  As Professor Coffee stated, “[I]t is hardly radical to 
urge that [shareholders] be given a say in how [their corporation] is run.”360 
 
355 Corporate Governance After Citizens United:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 51 (2010) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle 
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School). 
356 Id. (citing CENTER FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, HIDDEN RIVERS:  HOW TRADE 
ASSOCIATIONS CONCEAL CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING, ITS THREAT TO COMPANIES, AND 
WHAT SHAREHOLDERS CAN DO (2006)). 
357 See Michael K. Molitor, The Crucial Role of the Nominating Committee:  Re-Inventing 
Nominating Committees in the Aftermath of Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. 
L.J. 97, 136–38 (2010) (“[T]he ‘typical’ shareholder in a public corporation is said to be 
rationally apathetic.”). 
358 Id. at 138 (describing shareholder “apathy” that leads to “very little incentive to nominate 
directors”). 
359 Id. (noting that in recent decates there has been a “rise of ‘institutional’ shareholders, 
particularly mutual funds”). 
360 See Corporate Governance After Citizens United:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the United States H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 64 (2010) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle 
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School). 
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Professor Larry Ribstein has argued that regulatory efforts designed to 
improve shareholder rights may ultimately protect some shareholders at the 
cost of harming others.361  Professor Ribstein concludes that on balance, the 
public might indeed be better off without the imposition of incoherent 
regulations.362 
Despite these criticisms, under a contractarian perspective the 
shareholder approval mechanism would certainly be constitutional, despite 
impinging on the parties’ freedom of contract, and would likely be prudent 
as well.  Again, the mechanism is designed to allow shareholders to know 
what they are getting from their investment bargain and to prevent 
unfairness from infecting that bargain. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that the contractarian view of a corporation 
is not only helpful in analyzing the constitutionality of any corporation 
regulation, but also instructive when assessing the prudence of any such 
proposed regulation.  Contractarians typically assert that individuals should 
be allowed the liberty of contract to design their own transactions and that 
government should avoid mandatory regulatory action.  However, it is my 
thesis that because so many of those contracts as a class are flawed, 
regulation designed to correct those flaws is not only constitutional, but also 
appropriate.  I use contracts generally here to indicate that my thesis has 
broad application to any set of transactions that could be said to have flawed 
contracts at their core—from shareholders purchasing stock to consumers 
agreeing to credit card terms.  I set forth this contractarian framework for 
analysis in Part Two and then used it to assess the Citizens United decision 
itself and, in Part Three, two of the more widely proposed regulatory 
responses to the Citizens United decision.  In all three cases, because the 
bargain shareholders are making does not include the prospect of a 
corporation giving corporate funds away in an unregulated and unbridled 
way, regulation in this area serves to protect the interests of the shareholders 
in their bargain.  Regulation of election spending is all the more justified in 
this case because the very nature of our democratic system is at stake. 
 
361 Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019, 
1043 (2011) (arguing that “protecting the expressive rights of some shareholders may 
infringe the expression of other stakeholders and unacceptably restrict corporate 
speech”). 
362 Id. at 1043–44 (advocating that “in determining the constitutionality of governance 
regulation, courts must weigh protection of shareholder expression against frustrating 
corporate speech generally and the expression rights of particular shareholders and 
stakeholders” but concluding that “[t]he proposed . . . burden on corporate speech is 
likely to be too great even without this balancing”). 
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Citizens United has spawned a flood of interest in the effect corporate 
money has on politics in the United States.  Moreover, the majority’s 
opinion was the subject of a scathing dissent, and criticisms from both of the 
other branches of our government.  President Obama rebuked the Justices 
in the majority.  A group of senators has proposed a constitutional 
amendment to undo the opinion. 
While the lack of corporate disclosure of political spending makes it 
difficult to assess the effect the decision is actually having in our political 
system, statistics show that corporate political spending has grown 
exponentially and, at least in the gubernatorial elections, the money is going 
to Republicans three times as often as it is to Democrats.363 
The majority opinion in Citizens United spoke of safeguarding a 
fundamental principle of our Constitution, the First Amendment, to support 
its decision.  However, it failed to consider any of the prevailing corporate 
law scholarship when making its ruling.  The most widely accepted paradigm 
for understanding a corporation characterizes a corporation as nothing 
more than a nexus of contracts.  That paradigm would focus on the rights of 
the various constituents of a corporation rather than rights the corporation 
itself might possess.  The contractarian paradigm recognizes the fiction of 
corporate personhood and limits that fiction by putting it in service to the 
corporation’s constituents. 
The Citizens United opinion is complex, just as its implications are.  
However, sometimes it is helpful to see how simple complex issues can 
actually be.  Ben and Jerry, the corporate owners of the ice cream company, 
were speaking to a convocation recently and left the audience with this 
observation: 
“‘I’m Ben,’ began Ben & Jerry’s founder Ben Cohen.  ‘I’m a person.’ 
‘I’m Jerry,’ continued his partner, Jerry Greenfield.  ‘I’m a person.’ 
‘Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream, Inc. . . ’ proceeded Cohen, 
 
363 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The $500 Million Question:  Are the Democratic And Republican 
Governors Associations Really State PACs Under Buckley’s Major Purpose Test?, 15 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485, 502 (2012) (citing statistics showing that in 2010, the 
Republican Governors Association had raised and spent approximately three times as 
much as the Democratic Governors Association); see also ANNE KIM, A THUMB ON THE 
SCALES:  OUTSIDE SPENDING IN 2010 SENATE RACES 3 (Feb. 2012), available at 
http://progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2.2012-Kim_A-Thumb-on-
the-Scales_Outside-Spending-in-2010-Senate-Races.pdf (describing the relative spending 
by conservative and liberal groups in the 2010 Senate elections); Stephanie Ferrell et al., 
Super PAC spending, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), http://graphics.latimes.com/2012-
election-superpac-spending/ (depicting in graphical manner the amount spent by PACs 
supporting the various candidates for president in 2012). 
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‘. . . is not a person,’ finished Greenfield, to laughter and applause.”364 
The contractarian paradigm should empower both judicial and 
legislative bodies to appropriately regulate and even limit the activities of 
corporations.  It is my hope that this Article might encourage jurists and 
legislators to do just that. 
 
364 Carl Etnier, Montpelier Citizens United forum draws standing-room crowd, VTDIGGER.ORG 
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://vtdigger.org/2011/11/30/montpelier-citizens-united-forum-
draws-standing-room-crowd/. 
